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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
LAW QUARTERLY
Volume XXIII DECEMBER, 1937 Number 1
REGULATION OF MOTOR CARRIERS
EDWARD A. HAIDt
The Interstate Commerce Commission has said that motor
vehicle transportation supplies an agency which will permit
the fullest development of the country's economic situation by
permitting transportation and communication to reach remote
communities through territories unable to support more costly
railroad facilities.' Lower rates, frequency of arrivals and
departures, and the ability to pick up and discharge passengers
at almost any point along their routes suggest the causes
for the increasing popularity of motor carriers.2 Moreover motor
trucks have the advantage of being equipped to pick up and
deliver freight at store doors, thereby effecting great savings of
time and eliminating terminal congestion.
Such motor carriers as were operated exclusively in intrastate
operations were partially regulated by the states in which they
operated. But the industry was in a deplorable condition-the
regulations of the various states were not uniform, and so-called
"wild-catters" worked considerable injury to regular and respon-
sible bus and truck lines. These wild-catters cut rates, failed to
pay loss and damage claims, failed to account for c. o. d. ship-
ments, and failed to maintain their schedules if traffic was light.
Their lack of financial responsibility often left the shipper, pas-
senger or injured person without any available remedy. These
conditions led the Interstate Commerce Commission to recom-
mend national legislation which resulted in the enactment of the
Motor Carrier Act in 1935. 3
t Member, St. Louis, Missouri Bar.
1. Motor Bus and Motor Truck Operation (1928) 140 I. C. C. 685, 696,
718.
2. (1936) Annual Reports I. C. C.
3. (1935) 49 Stat. ch. 498, sec. 201-227, 49 U. S. C. A. sec. 301-327. Sub-
sequent specific section references are to the Statutes at Large. With the
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I. PURPOSE OF FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER ACT
The Federal Motor Carrier Act applies, in all of its terms, to
common and contract carriers by motor vehicle. Section 202 re-
cites that it is
declared to be the policy of Congress to regulate transporta-
tion by motor carriers in such manner as to recognize and
preserve the inherent advantages of, and foster sound eco-
nomic conditions in, such transportation and among such
carriers in the public interest; promote adequate, economi-
cal, and efficient service by motor carriers, and reasonable
charges therefor, without unjust discriminations, undue
preferences or advantages, and unfair or destructive com-
petitive practices; improve the relations between and co-
ordinate transportation by and regulation of, motor carriers
and other carriers; develop and preserve a highway trans-
portation system properly adapted to the needs of the Com-
merce of the United States and of the national defense.
This declared policy is referred to in several sections of the
Act and becomes important in determining their application.'
Section 209 (b) provides that the Commission may issue a per-
mit to contract carriers "if it appears * * * that the proposed
operation * * * will be consistent with * * * the policy declared
in section 202." In prescribing rates under section 216 (i) con-
sideration should be given
to the inherent advantages of transportation by such car-
riers; to the effect of rates upon the movement of traffic by
such carriers; to the need, in the public interest, of adequate
and efficient transportation service by such carriers at the
lowest cost consistent with the furnishing of such service;
and to the need of revenues sufficient to enable such carriers,
under honest, economical, and efficient management, to pro-
vide such service.
constitutionality of the Federal Motor Carriers Act this article is not con-
cerned. That regulation of interstate motor traffic is within the commerce
power of Congress is unquestionable, for the most rigid interpretation of
the scope of that clause would include the actual instrumentalities of inter-
state movement. No effort is made by Congress in the Act to impair state
power over intrastate commerce. The Act is to apply "to the transporta-
tion of passengers or property by motor carriers engaged in interstate and
foreign commerce," (sec. 202b) and it is provided explicitly that nothing
in the Act shall be construed "to authorize a motor carrier to do an intra-
state business on the highways of any State, or to interfere with the
exclusive exercise by each State of the power of regulation of intrastate
commerce" (see. 202c).
4. The Tap Line Cases (1913) 234 U. S. 1, 27, 34 S. Ct. 741, 58 L. ed.
1185.
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Whenever any charge of any carrier contravenes the declared
policy, the Commission is authorized by section 218 (b) to make
any change or alteration necessary to make the charge conform
to said policy.
The Interstate Commerce Commission has asserted that the
Act is designed to provide adequate and efficient motor carrier
service in the public interest and to abolish cut-throat competi-
tion and its attendant evils.44
It might well be said of the Motor Carrier Act, as the Supreme
Court said of the Interstate Commerce Act, that in its control
of the motor carrier transportation system Congress "is seeking
to make the system adequate to the needs of the country by secur-
ing for it a reasonable compensatory return for all the work it
does" and to eliminate waste.6 To such extent it is viewed as a
direct concern of the public.7
Although it is the policy of the Act "to improve the relations
between and co-ordinate transportation by motor carriers and
other carriers," particularly the railroads, the fact that a par-
ticular point has adequate rail service does not justify the refusal
to issue a certificate to a motor common-carrier where there are
inherent advantages in transportation by motor vehicle.,
II. STATE TAXATION
The Federal Motor Carrier Act provides, inter alia, that noth-
ing in the Act "shall be construed to affect the powers of taxation
of the several states." 9
A state may impose a license or occupation tax on one engaged
in both interstate and intrastate commerce within its borders,
but the tax must be imposed solely on the basis of the intrastate
business done. 0 It must appear that one engaged exclusively in
interstate commerce would not be subject to the imposition and
4a. Contracts of Contract Carriers (1937) 1 M. C. C. 628.
5. Railroad Commission v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. (1921) 257 U. S.
563, 589, 42 S. Ct. 232, 66 L. ed. 371.
6. State of Texas v. United States (1934) 292 U. S. 522, 532, 54 S. Ct.
819, 78 L. ed. 1402.
7. Ibid.
8. Edwin A. Bowles application (1937) 1 M. C. C. 589.
9. Sec. 202(c).
10. Pacific T. & T. Co. v. Tax Comm. (1936) 297 U. S. 403, 56 S. Ct.
522, 80 L. ed. 76; Cooney v. Mountain States T. & T. Co. (1934) 294 U. S.
384, 55 S. Ct. 477, 79 L. ed. 934; East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Comin. (1930)
283 U. S. 465, 51 S. Ct. 449, 75 L. ed. 1171; Sprout v. City of South Bend
(1927) 277 U. S. 163, 48 S. Ct. 502, 72 L. ed. 833.
19371
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that one doing both an intra- and interstate business could dis-
continue the former without withdrawing from the interstate
business.1
In the exercise of its police powers a state may rightfully
require the registration of motor vehicles and the licensing of
their drivers, charging reasonable fees therefor.1 2 It may also
exact reasonable compensation from both intra- and interstate
carriers for the use and maintenance of state highways and the
regulation of traffic thereover."3
But such a tax cannot be sustained unless it appears affirma-
tively that it is levied only as compensation for the use or up-
keep of the highways or to defray the expense of regulating
motor traffic thereover. 14
A state may, of course, lay a property tax on all property
located within its borders, whether used in intra- or interstate
commerce. 5 But a state may not tax property neither located
nor used within its confines.0 However, if intrastate property
is part of an interstate system, it may be taxed according to its
enhanced value as part of the system.'7
But no state can tax interstate commerce. Therefore, it can-
not place duties on "the transportation of the subjects of that
commerce, or on the receipts derived from that transportation,
or on the occupation or business of carrying it on."' 8
The cases involving railroads furnish appropriate analogies
in this connection, for it is probable that the same law will be
11. Sprout v. City of South Bend, supra.
12. Hendrick v. Maryland (1914) 235 U. S. 610, 35 S. Ct. 140, 59 L. ed.
385.
13. Interstate Transit Co. v. Lindsey (1930) 283 U. S. 183, 51 S. Ct.
380, 75 L. ed. 953; Sprout v. City of South Bend (1927) 277 U. S. 163,
48 S. Ct. 502, 72 L. ed. 833; Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett (1927) 276
U. S. 245, 48 S. Ct. 230, 72 L. ed. 551; Michigan P. U. Comm. v. Duke
(1924) 266 U. S. 570, 45 S. Ct. 191, 69 L. ed. 445; Kane v. New Jersey
(1916) 242 U. S. 160, 37 S. Ct. 30, 61 L. ed. 222; Hendrick v. Maryland,
supra.
14. Sprout v. City of South Bend, supra; Interstate Transit Co. v. Lind-
sey, supra.
15. International P. Co. v. Massachusetts (1918) 246 U. S. 135, 38 S. Ct.
292, 62 L. ed. 624; St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. v. Arkansas (1914) 235 U. S.
350, 35 S. Ct. 99, 59 L. ed. 265; Postal T. C. Co. v. Adams (1895) 155 U. S.
688, 15 S. Ct. 268, 37 L. ed. 311.
16. Ibid.
17. Pullman Co. v. Richardson (1923) 261 U. S. 330, 43 S. Ct. 366, 67
L. ed. 682.
18. Lyng v. Michigan (1889) 135 U. S. 161, 10 S. Ct. 725, 34 L. ed.
150; Leloup v. Mobile (1888) 127 U. S. 640, 646, 8 S. Ct. 1380, 32 L. ed. 311.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol23/iss1/1
REGULATION OF MOTOR CARRIERS
applied to motor carriers. Thus, a tax on the gross receipts of
an intrastate and interstate railroad was held void,", as was a
tax upon the receipts from interstate commerce.20 A tax on the
entire capital stock of a foreign corporation, or a given per-
centage thereof, was declared void ;21 but an ad valorem tax
based on the value of such proportion of the capital stock as the
mileage within the state bears to the tital mileage is valid. 22 A
tax could not be validly levied upon freight or messages trans-
ported or transmitted in interstate commerce.22
III. STATE REGULATION
The Federal Act also provides that the provisions of the Act
shall not be so construed as to "interfere with the exclusive exer-
cise by each state of the power of regulation of intrastate com-
merce by motor carriers on the highways thereof. '24
A motor carrier cannot evade state regulation "by the mere
linking of its intrastate transportation to its interstate or by the
unnecessary transportation of both classes by means of the same
instrumentalities and employees.'25
What of the situation in which intra- and interstate commerce
are inextricably intermingled? The problem has not as yet been
decided under the Motor Carrier Act. In all probability, the deci-
sion in Railroad Commission v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. 26 will
be followed, which would permit Congress to impose any reason-
able condition on a state's regulation of interstate carriers for
intrastate commerce as it deems necessary or desirable.
19. Fisher's Blend Station v. Tax Comm. (1936) 231 U. S. 68, 34 S. Ct.
15, 58 L. ed. 127; Oklahoma v. Wells, Fargo & Co. (1911) 223 U. S. 298,
32 S. Ct. 218, 56 L. ed. 445; Galveston H. & S. H. Ry. Co. v. Texas (1907)
210 U. S. 217, 28 S. Ct. 638, 52 L. ed. 1031.
20. East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Comm. (1930) 283 U. S. 465, 51 S. Ct.
449, 75 L. ed. 1171; Baltic M. Co. v. Massachusetts (1913) 231 U. S. 68,
34 S. Ct. 15, 58 L. ed. 127.
21. Air-Way E. A. Corp. v. Day (1924) 266 U. S. 71, 45 S. Ct. 12, 69
L. ed. 169; International P. Co. v. Massachusetts (1918) 246 U. S. 135, 38
S. Ct. 292, 62 L. ed. 624; Western U. T. Co. v. Kansas (1909) 216 U. S. 1,
30 S. Ct. 190, 54 L. ed. 355.
22. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. v. Arkansas (1914) 235 U. S. 350, 35 S. Ct.
99, 59 L. ed. 265; Western U. T. Co. v. Massachusetts (1887) 125 U. S.
530, 8 S. Ct. 961, 31 L. ed. 790.
23. Western U. T. Co. v. Texas (1882) 105 U. S. 460, 26 L. ed. 1067;
Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania (1873) 15 Wall. 232, 21 L. ed. 146.
24. Sec. 202(c).
25. Interstate Busses Corp. v. Holyoke St. Ry. Co. (1927) 273 U. S. 45,
47 S. Ct. 298, 71 L. ed. 530.
26. (1921) 257 U. S. 563, 42 S. Ct. 232, 66 L. ed. 371.
19371
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The language of the Act refers to the exclusively intrastate
traffic and strictly domestic commerce.27 When intra- and inter-
state commerce are so mingled together that the federal govern-
ment cannot "exercise complete effective control over interstate
commerce without incidental regulation of intrastate commerce,
such incidental regulation is not an invasion of state authority
or a violation of the proviso.128
In the railroad cases the Supreme Court held that when the
Interstate Commerce Commission found that intrastate rates
discriminated against interstate commerce it might order the
discrimination removed by increasing the intrastate rates.29 In
the Motor Carrier Act, however, Congress has expressly provided
that nothing therein "shall empower the Commission to pre-
scribe, or in any manner regulate, the rate, fare, or charge for
intrastate transportation, or for any service connected there-
with, for the purpose of removing discrimination against inter-
state commerce or for any other purpose whatever."180
IV. THE FEDERAL ACT: WHAT MOTOR CARRIERS REGULATED
The Act applies to common, contract, and private carriers. A
common carrier is defined in the Act as one who undertakes "to
transport passengers or property * * * for the general public
* * * whether over regular or irregular routes."' A contract
carrier is defined as one who "under special and individual con-
tracts or agreements * * * transports passengers or property
in interstate or foreign commerce." 32 A private carrier is de-
fined as one "not included in the terms 'common carrier' * * *
or 'contract carrier' * * *, who or which transports in interstate
or foreign commerce by motor vehicle property of which such
27. Houston, E. & W. T. By. Co. v. United States (1913) 234 U. S.
342, 34 S. Ct. 833, 839, 58 L. ed. 1341.
28. Railroad Comm. v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. (1921) 257 U. S. 563,
42 S. Ct. 232, 66 L. ed. 371.
29. State of Florida v. United States (1931) 282 U. S. 194, 51 S. Ct.
119, 75 L. ed. 291; Board of R. R. Comm. v. Great N. Ry. Co. (1930) 281
U. S. 412, 50 S. Ct. 391, 74 L. ed. 936; Railroad Commission v. Chicago,
B. & Q. Ry. Co. (1921) 257 U. S. 563, 42 S. Ct. 232, 66 L. ed. 371; Illinois
C. Ry. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm. (1918) 245 U. S. 493, 38 S. Ct. 170,
62 L. ed. 425; Houston E. & W. T. Ry. Co. v. United States (1913) 234
U. S. 342, 34 S. Ct. 833, 58 L. ed. 1341.
30. See. 216(f).
31. Sec. 203 (a) (14). The above mentioned definition of a common car-
rier is in consonance with the general legal definition. Michigan P. U.
Comm. v. Duke (1925) 266 U. S. 570, 45 S. Ct. 191, 69 L. ed. 445.
32. See. 203 (a) (15).
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person is the owner, lessee or bailee, when such transportation
is for the purpose of sale, lease, rent or bailment, or in further-
ance of any commercial purpose."3 3
The Interstate Commerce Commission has held that one who
holds himself out as ready to enter into a contract of haulage for
any or all may thereby become a common carrier. Thus, where
the testimony showed that one had verbal contracts with eight
persons or concerns, that he proposed to hold himself out as
being ready to serve anyone who called him to transport com-
modities at his tariff rates, and that he intended actively to
solicit business, such a person was held to be a common carrier.34
The Commission has ordered that
all contract carriers of property by motor vehicle ** * shall
transport under contracts or agreements which shall be in
writing, which shall provide for transportation for a par-
ticular shipper or shippers, which shall be bilateral and im-
pose specific obligations upon both carrier and shipper or
shippers, which shall cover a series of shipments during a
stated period of time in contrast to contracts of carriage
governing individual shipments, and copies of which shall
be preserved by the carriers parties thereto so long as the
contracts or agreements are in force and for at least one
year thereafter3 5
Contract carriers are regulated because
a contract carrier has certain inherent advantages in com-
petition over a common carrier. * * * The common carrier
holding itself out to carry traffic of a certain description
must serve all who seek its services, and under the act it
must serve them without unjust discrimination and adhere
to published rates. The contract carrier, on the other hand,
is free to pick and choose among shippers, and under the
act it may discriminate in its service to them and its charges
may be called in question only if they are found to fall below
a reasonable minimum level.36
33. Sec. 203(a) (17).
34. Paul Beatty application (1936) 1 M. C. C. 141; W. R. Whitman
application (1937) 1 M. C. C. 527.
35. Contracts of Contract Carriers (1937) 1 M. C. C. 628, 632.
36. Ibid. "Under such conditions, shippers, especially those who have
a large volume of traffic to offer, may play the contract carrier against the
common carrier and contract carriers against each other, with the result
that the unfair and destructive competition which Congress sought in the
act to abate is instead intensified, particularly in view of the fact that the
publication of their specific rates, as required by the act, makes the com-
mon carriers open targets. Ultimately, also, such conditions prove detri-
mental, not only to the carriers, both common and contract, but to the
shippers, the public safety, and the welfare of employees."
19371
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Whether one is a common carrier or a contract carrier is a
question which may result in much litigation. Construing the
language of the Act, the Interstate Commerce Commission has
said that
the absence of the words "for the general public" from the
definition of a contract carrier, and their inclusion in the
definition of a common carrier, reflect the fundamental dis-
tinction between the two.37
Section 219 requires all common carriers to execute contracts
covering each shipment transported. Thus it would seem that
the existence of a contract is of little significance in determining
the "common" or "contract" status of a carrier. The Commis-
sion has held that if any meaning is to be ascribed to the words
"special and individual contracts or agreements" in the defini-
tion of a contract carrier38 "they must be taken as requiring that
a contract carrier be a party to a contract or agreement differ-
ing from the contract of a common carrier."'39 As to this con-
tract, the Commission has said that it
must be one that has mutuality, that is, a contract whereby
the shipper is obligated to furnish some definite or easily
ascertainable minimum amount of freight during the term
of the contract, or for a given period, and the carrier is
bound to transport the freight agreed to be shipped, for the
consideration specified in the contract or agreement. The
rights, duties, and obligations of carrier and shipper must
be well defined.40
The following language of the Commission is significant
In determining the status of a carrier, the essential con-
sideration is the general character of his business and of his
holding out to shippers. Does he confine his services to
specially selected shippers, or does he, in substance and
effect, offer his services, within the limits of his capacity,
to shippers generally who desire such transportation as he
undertakes to furnish? The number of shippers for whom
a carrier performs transportation has a bearing on this mat-
ter, as has the character of the contracts under which the
service is furnished. Neither is controlling, but both are to
be considered, along with other evidentiary facts, in deter-
37. Earl W. Slagle application (1937) 2 M. C. C. 127.
38. Sec. 203 (a) (15).
39. Earl W. Slagle application (1937) 2 M. C. C. 127.
40. Western Transport application (1937) 2 M. C. C. 107; Contracts of
Contract Carriers (1937) 1 MW. C. C. 628, 632.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol23/iss1/1
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mining the general character of the business and nature of
the undertaking.4'
Some nice distinctions are required in determining whether
one is a common, contract or private carrier. In one case the
carrier was engaged primarily in transporting milk from farm to
creamery. If this had been all he had done, he would have come
within the exempted class,411 but upon completion of his milk
deliveries he would (if he had an order) proceed to a coal mine,
purchase coal with his own funds, transport it to his customer
at a price from four to five dollars per ton in excess of the cost
of the coal to him and thus obtain his compensation for the haul.
He performed this service for anyone upon request and at the
time of the hearing had about twenty-five customers, principally
farmers served on his milk route. The Commission held that
"essentially he undertakes through a special arrangement to
transport coal for the general public for compensation and there-
fore comes within the statutory definition of a common car-
rier.1,2
Another carrier was engaged primarily in transporting cheese
for Armour & Company. On his return trips he purchased vari-
ous commodities on orders of customers, transported and sold
them to his customers at a price approximating their cost to him
plus the cost of transportation. It was contended that he was a
private carrier transporting for sale property of which he was
the owner, but the Commission held that the back haul transpor-
tation was "in reality for compensation as a common carrier.""4
A case of interest is that of E. A. Carroll, who entered into
a contract with a wholesaler under the terms of which the con-
tractor furnished two four-ton trucks for the wholesaler's regu-
lar service and had available a two-ton truck for the transporta-
tion of the wholesaler's shipments when required. The trucks
were painted and lettered according to the wholesaler's specifica-
tions but bore small signs: "This truck owned and operated by
E. A. Carroll Trucking Company." The contractor received a
stated amount each week for the use of the two trucks used in
regular service and a stated amount per day for the smaller
41. Earl W. Slagle application (1937) 2 M. C. C. 127.
41a. See sec. 203(b).
42. Lyle H. Carpenter application (1937) 2 M. C. C. 85.
43. T. J. McBroom application (1937) 1 M. C. C. 425.
19371
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truck when used. The contractor furnished the drivers and the
wholesaler provided helpers. The drivers were paid by the con-
tractor and were under his control. Each morning the trucks
were placed at the wholesaler's loading platform and the drivers
were instructed by the wholesaler concerning the routes to be
taken and what shipments were to be picked up and delivered.
The Commission decided that the owner was a contract carrier,
as against the contention that the wholesaler was acting as a
private carrier.44
The Act makes it the duty of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission to "regulate" common carriers and contract carriers.
41
The various phases of regulation of these two types of carriers,
as well as the provisions applicable to private carriers, are set
out in the footnote. 46 Certain types of regulation will be dis-
cussed in another part of the article.
V. EXEMPTIONS
Certain types of motor carriers are expressly exempted from
the terms of the Act.47 These exemptions are significant. The
validity of certain of these exemptions has already been ques-
tioned under the Motor Carrier Act. In other instances, it is
possible to predict to some extent their validity by reviewing
decisions in state courts rendered under similar provisions of
state statutes.
The -following are the exemptions:
1. Motor vehicles employed solely in transporting school chil-
dren and teachers to and from school.
44. (1937) 1 M. C. C. 788.
45. Sec. 204.
46. In the regulation of common carriers it is authorized to (1) establish
reasonable requirements with respect to continuous and adequate service,
transportation of baggage and express; (2) establish uniform systems of
accounts, records and reports and preservation of records; (3) establish
qualifications of employees; (4) establish maximum hours of service of
employees; (5) provide rules of safety and operation of equipment; (6)
inquire into their organization; (7) inquire into the management of their
business; (8) keep itself informed as to the manner and method in -which
the same is conducted; and (9) transmit to Congress, from time to time,
recommendations as to such additional legislation as the Commission may
deem necessary.
The provisions of (2), (3), (4), and (5) are also applicable to contract
carriers.
As to private carriers the Commission is authorized "if need therefor
be found," to establish reasonable requirements to promote safety of opera-
tion, and to that end prescribe (1) qualifications of employees, (2) maxi-
mum hours of employees, and (3) standards of equipment.
47. Sec. 203(b).
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The Supreme Court, passing upon the validity of such an ex-
emption in a state statute, has held that the distinct public inter-
est in this type of carrier justifies the classification. 48 The su-
preme courts of Idaho, 49 California, 5 and Minnesota5' have ruled
to the same effect.
2. Taxicabs or other motor vehicles performing a bona fide
taxicab service, having a capacity of not more than six pas-
sengers and not operated on a regular route or between fixed
termini.
3. Motor vehicles owned or operated by or on behalf of hotels
and used exclusively for the transportation of hotel patrons be-
tween hotels and local railroad or other common carrier stations.
4. Motor vehicles operated under authorization, regulation,
and control of the Secretary of the Interior, principally for the
purpose of transporting persons in and about the national parks
and national monuments.
5. Motor vehicles controlled and operated by any farmer, and
used in the transportation of his agricultural commodities and
products thereof, or in the transportation of supplies to his farm.
It has been held by a state court that such an exemption does
not constitute an arbitrary discrimination.52
6. Motor vehicles controlled and operated by a cooperative
association as defined in the Agricultural Marketing Act.
7. Trolley busses operated by electrical power driven from a
fixed overhead wire, furnishing local passenger transportation
similar to street railway service.
8. Motor vehicles used exclusively in carrying livestock, fish
(including shell fish), or agricultural commodities (not including
manufactured products thereof).
The Supreme Court has held a similar exemption to be dis-
criminatory in so far as it relieves the carrier from securing
certificates of convenience and giving bond to secure the payment
of any judgment for injuries resulting from operation, asserting
that there is no distinction between those carriers which carry
farm commodities and those which carry such other food com-
48. Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring (1932) 286 U. S. 352, 52 S. Ct.
595, 76 L. ed. 1155.
49. Smallwood v. Jeter (1926) 42 Idaho 169, 244 Pac. 149.
50. Bacon Serv. Corp. v. Huss (1926) 199 Cal. 21, 248 Pac. 235.
51. State v. La Febvre (1928) 174 Minn. 3, 219 N. W. 167.
52. State v. King (Me. 1936) 188 Atl. 775, 778.
1937]
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modities as groceries and bakery products. There is no reason
why the one should be required to give security for possible acci-
dents and the other relieved of such obligationsA
3
In its latest decision on the matter the Supreme Court, refer-
ring to an exemption in favor of "vehicles engaged exclusively
in the transportation of agricultural or dairy products, whether
the vehicle is owned by the owner or producer of such agricul-
tural or dairy products or not, so long as the title remains in the
producer," considered the fact that "many of the farm products
must be brought from remote sections unaccommodated by the
better system of roads * * * in some cases not even by a public
road." This necessitates offering some inducement to carriers
"in order to insure adequate service in the transportation of such
commodities. * * * A classification thus designed to ameliorate
the lot of the producers of farm and dairy products is not an
arbitrary preference within the meaning and the condemnation
of the Fourteenth Amendment." 54
It will be noted that the Federal Motor Carrier Act exempts
motor vehicles transporting agricultural commodities, etc., "not
including manufactured products thereof." Construing this lan-
guage the Interstate Commerce Commission has held that "one
who has been engaged solely in the transportation of grain and
an occasional load of coal which he purchased at the mine and
transported as his own property," is not subject to the Act;",
but if one who is exempt should, on his return trip, transport for
hire property that is not exempt, he is subject to all the provi-
sions of the Act.58 It has also been held that milk and cream are
neither processed nor manufactured and the haulers thereof are
exempt, but that cottage cheese is processed and therefore not an
exempted commodity.57
9. Motor vehicles used exclusively in the distribution of news-
papers.
The Supreme Court of Maine has reasoned that inasmuch as
the newspaper, with its timely news, legal notices, financial re-
ports, weather forecasts, and other essential information has no
53. Smith v. Cahoon (1931) 283 U. S. 553, 51 S. Ct. 582, 75 L. ed. 1264.
54. Aero-Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia P. S. Co. (1935) 295 U. S.
285, 55 S. Ct. 709, 79 L. ed. 1439.
55. Frank Janesofsky application (1937) 1 M. C. C. 799.
56. State v. Whitaker (Fla. 1937) 171 So. 521.
57. Joseph Pohl application (1937) 1 M. C. C. 707.
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substitute, an exemption which permits its unlicensed convey-
ance by motor vehicles to places in many instances not served
by common, nor even by contract carriers, is justified.58
Nor (unless and to the extent that the Commission shall from
time to time find that such application is necessary to carry out
the policy of Congress) shall the provisions of the Act, other
than those regulating employees and safety of equipment apply
to:
10. The transportation of passengers or property in interstate
or foreign commerce wholly within a municipality or between
contiguous municipalities or within a zone adjacent to and com-
mercially a part of any municipality or municipalities except
when such transportation is under a common control, manage-
ment, or arrangement for a continuous carriage or shipment to
or from a point without such municipality, municipalities, or
zone, and provided that the motor carrier engaged in such trans-
portation of passengers over regular or irregular route or routes
in interstate commerce is also lawfully engaged in the intrastate
transportation of passengers over the entire length of such inter-
state route or routes in accordance with the laws of each state
having jurisdiction.
Generally laws exempting carriers who transport wholly with-
in municipalities have been upheld. Thus an exemption of car-
riers who operate wholly within any city or village, or within
a radius of twenty-five miles beyond the corporate limits of such,
was held valid.5 9
The Federal Motor Carrier Act, of course, does not apply to
purely local intrastate traffic. By this provision it is also made
inapplicable to transportation between such points as St. Louis,
Missouri, and East St. Louis, Illinois. Such transportation, al-
though interstate, is between two municipalities which are con-
tiguous and commercially one. Construing the language of the
Act, "between contiguous municipalities or within a zone adja-
cent to and commercially a part of such municipality or munici-
palities," the Interstate Commerce Commission has said
The generally accepted meanings of these respective terms
are that a municipality is a town, city or other similar dis-
58. State v. King (Me. 1936) 188 Atl. 775, 778.
59. State v. Goeson (N. D. 1935) 262 N. W. 70; Hoover Motor Exp. Co.
v. Fort (Tenn. 1934) 72 S. W. (2d) 1052; Continental Baking Co. v. Wood-
ring (1932) 286 U. S. 352, 52 S. Ct. 595, 76 L. ed. 1155; State v. Le Febvre
(Minn. 1928) 219 N. W. 167.
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trict having powers of local self-government and that "con-
tiguous municipalities" are municipalities which touch or
adjoin at the edge or boundary or are in close proximity to
one another. * * * To be "contiguous" for the purpose of
this act we are of the opinion that there must be direct com-
munication by motor vehicle between the municipalities.
Referring to the situation at St. Louis, it has held that certain
municipalities which lie across the Mississippi River from St.
Lous are not contiguous "because there are no means of com-
munication by motor vehicles between them and St. Louis except
through other municipalities. °6 0 The Commission has held that
there should be no exemption in cases where "two cities are con-
tiguous in the sense that their boundaries join at some place but
are not part of a single terminal" ;60o that the commercial zone
of a municipality cannot be found to include all of the territory
within the commercial influence of a municipality; but that it
includes only those areas which are "commercially a part" of the
municipalities and are adjacent thereto.
Ordinarily, only that transportation which is performed over
city streets may be considered intraterminal in character.
However, it may be necessary frequently to pass through
small areas of unimproved land, or land devoted to agri-
culture, in order to transport passengers and property be-
tween points within a commercial zone.,'
The exemption does not apply where the transportation, al-
though otherwise within the exemption, "is under a common
control, management or arrangement for a continuous carriage
or shipment to or from a point without such municipality, mu-
nicipalities, or zone." Thus the meaning of "common control,
management or arrangement" must be considered.
The Commission has held that a carrier is not exempt even
though its entire operations are performed within a municipal
area, if it operates under specific contract with a line-haul car-
rier, as this constitutes transportation under a common arrange-
ment for a continuous carriage or shipment to or from a point
without such municipal area.62
11. Nor to the casual, occasional or reciprocal transportation
of passengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce for
60. St. Louis-East St. Louis Commercial Zone (1937) 1 M. C. C. 656.
60a. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. Scott Bros. Application, M. C. 2744 (not yet reported).
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compensation by any person not engaged in transportation by
motor vehicle as a regular occupation or business.
In the deliberation in Congress, the word "reciprocal" was
thus explained
If you and I are neighbors owning adjoining farms, and you
go to market and bring back something for me and I pay
you for it, and then six months later I go to market and
bring back something for you and you pay me for it, that
is a reciprocal transaction and would not come within this
legislation.6 3
VI. THE POWER TO REGULATE
The Act empowers the Commission "to regulate" common and
contract carriers.
The Supreme Court of the United States has said
To regulate in the sense intended, is to foster, protect and
control the commerce with appropriate regard to the wel-
fare of those who are immediately concerned, as well as the
public at large, and to promote its growth and insure its
safety. 4
To this we might add "and carry out the policy expressed by
Congress."
In regard to regulation of railroads, the Supreme Court has
said that the investigatory and supervisory powers of the Com-
mission extend to all of the activities of carriers which could
in any way affect their benefits or burden as agents of the pub-
lic.8 8 However, it has also been said that although the public
has the power to prescribe rules for securing faithful and effi-
cient service and equality among shippers, yet the carrier is the
private property of its owner and therefore the owner has the
right "generally to manage the important interests upon the
same principles which are recognized as sound, and adopted in
other trades and pursuits."69 In no proper sense is the public a
general manager.7 0
63. (1935) 79 Cong. Rec. 12209.
64. Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. v. United States (1924) 263 U. S. 456, 44
S. Ct. 169, 68 L. ed. 383; Second Employers' Liability Cases (1911) 223
U. S. 1, 47, 32 S. Ct. 169, 56 L. ed. 327.
65-67. Omitted.
68. Smith v. Interstate Comm. Comm. (1917) 245 U. S. 33, 38 S. Ct. 30,
62 L. ed. 135.
69. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Comm. Comm. (1895)
162 U. S. 184, 16 S. Ct. 700, 40 L. ed. 935.
70. Interstate Comm. Comm. v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. (1908) 209
U. S. 108, 28 S. Ct. 493, 52 L. ed. 705.
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The following discussion is concerned with the various phases
of regulation 70 1 to which motor carriers may be subjected by the
Interstate Commerce Commission under the terms of the Act.
Continuous and Adequate Service-In furtherance of its power
to regulate common (but not contract or private) carriers, the
Commission is authorized to "establish reasonable requirements
with respect to continuous and adequate service, transportation
of baggage and express. 171
A common carrier is by law obliged to transport all goods of
the kind it undertakes or assumes to transport, and which are
properly offered, to the extent of its capacity; but it is not liable
if its failure to furnish service is the result of sudden and great
demands which it had no reason to apprehend would be made.
72
Accounts-It is made the duty of the Commission to establish
reasonable requirements with respect to "uniform systems of
accounts, records, and reports, preservation of records" for both
common and contract carriers.73 Query: Is the Commission's
authority over the accounts of interstate motor carriers exclu-
sive, or may the states prescribe a system of accounts to record
the movement of intrastate commerce of carriers who are en-
gaged in both intra- and interstate commerce? This is a question
which may lead to considerable litigation, although it is possible
the states may adopt the accounting rules promulgated by the
Interstate Commerce Commission.
On the one hand, it may be argued that the state alone has
jurisdiction over the accounts relating to intrastate commerce,
at least until Congress expressly evidences an intent to assume
control of both the intra- and interstate business of carriers who
are engaged in interstate commerce. This position is in harmony
with the general rule that it should never be held that Congress
intends to supersede state powers even where it has the power
to do so unless it clearly manifests such purpose.7 4
In this connection it is significant that section 20 (5) of the
70a. See note 46, supra.
71. Sec. 204(a) (1).
72. Midland V. Ry. Co. v. Barldey (1927) 276 U. S. 482, 48 S. Ct. 342,
72 L. ed. 664; Pennsylvania Ry. Co. v. Puritan C. M. Co. (1914) 237 U. S.
121, 35 S. Ct. 484, 59 L. ed. 867.
73. Sec. 204(a) (1 & 2).
74. Illinois Central R. Co. v. Public Util. Com. (1918) 245 U. S. 493,
38 S. Ct. 170, 62 L. ed. 425; Giloary v. Cuyahoga R. Co. (1934) 292 U. S.
57, 54 S. Ct. 573, 78 L. ed. 1123.
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Interstate Commerce Act, applicable to railroads, authorizes the
Commission to "prescribe the forms of any and all accounts"
and expressly provides that "it shall be unlawful for such car-
riers to keep any other accounts * * **,,75 No such prohibition
appears in the Federal Motor Carrier Act, from which it might
be inferred that Congress intended not to interfere with the
power of the states to prescribe the accounting systems covering
intrastate traffic.
On the other hand, it may be argued that to require motor
carriers to keep duplicate systems of accounts, one according to
the state regulations covering intrastate shipments and another
according to the interstate formula covering interstate ship-
ments, is hardly in harmony with the purpose of Congress to
establish and maintain "economical and efficient service by motor
carriers" in the interest of the "needs of the commerce of the
United States and of the national defense," and that where intra-
state commerce and interstate commerce are so interwoven that
the regulation of one "involves the control of the other, it is
Congress and not the state, that is entitled to prescribe the final
and dominant rule."76
In construing section 20 (5) of the Interstate Commerce Act
the Supreme Court, in answer to the contention that, if upheld,
the Act would enable the Commission to regulate the intra- as
well as interstate business of a carrier, 'said that such regulations
of the Interstate Commerce Commission are not regulations of
intrastate commerce. The Court's rationale is that the Commis-
sion must have the information supplied by the all-inclusive uni-
form accounting system in order to successfully perform its
duties. Otherwise, forbidden practices could be concealed. The
object is to supply the Commission with information so that it
may "properly regulate such matters as are really within its
jurisdiction" and is "not to enable it to regulate affairs of the
corporation not within its jurisdiction."''7
Qualifications of Employees-The Commission is also required
to establish "qualifications" of employees of common and con-
75. (1920) 41 Stat. 493, 49 U. S. C. A. sec. 20 (5).
76. Houston E. & W. T. R. Co. v. United States (1914) 234 U. S. 342,
34 S. Ct. 833, 58 L. ed. 1341; United States v. New York C. R. Co. (1926)
272 U. S. 457, 47 S. Ct. 130, 71 L. ed. 350.
77. Interstate Commerce Com. v. Goodrich Transit Co. (1912) 224 U. S.
194, 32 S. Ct. 436, 56 L. ed. 729.
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tract carriers, and "if need therefor is found," for private car-
riers and carriers otherwise exempted.7 8
The power of the states to enact legislation prescribing the
qualifications of employees of interstate carriers until Congress
acts, and the exclusiveness of Congressional action on the same
subject, is settled law.7 9
Of course, Congress cannot, either directly or through the
Commission, prescribe the qualifications of those employees of
an interstate carrier who engage only in intrastate commerce ;8O
but if an employee is engaged in the transportation of both intra-
and interstate commerce he is subject to the provisions of the
Federal Act, notwithstanding "that the interstate and intrastate
operations * * * are so interwoven that it is utterly impracticable
for them to divide their employees in such manner that the
duties of those who are engaged in connection with interstate
commerce shall be confined to that commerce exclusively." 8'
Hours of Service-The Act also makes it the duty of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission to regulate the "maximum hours
of service of employees" of common carriers, contract carriers,
motor carriers otherwise exempted by its provisions, and "if
need therefor is found," private carriers as well. 82
It has long been the law that it is the duty of the law-making
bodies to advance the safety, happiness, and prosperity of the
people and to provide for their general welfare.83 "The length
of hours of service has direct relation to the efficiency of the
human agency upon which protection to life and property neces-
sarily depends," and it is therefore competent for Congress "to
consider and endeavor to reduce the dangers incident to the
strain of excessive hours of duty" on the part of employees of
interstate carriers.84
Although the states may have, by legislation, regulated the
78. Sec. 225.
79. Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Alabama (1888) 128 U. S. 96, 9
S. Ct. 28, 32 L. ed. 352; Smith v. Alabama (1888) 124 U. S. 465, 482, 8
S. Ct. 564, 31 L. ed. 508.
80. Howard v. Illinois C. R. Co. (1908) 207 U. S. 463, 28 S. Ct. 141,
52 L. ed. 297.
81. Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Com. (1911) 221 U. S.
612, 31 S. Ct. 621, 55 L. ed. 878.
82. Sec. 225.
83. State v. Miln (1837) 11 Pet. 102, 9 L. ed. 648.
84. Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Com. (1911) 221 U. S.
612, 31 S. Ct. 621, 55 L. ed. 878.
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hours of service within their respective borders, such legislation
does not prohibit Congress from regulating the hours of those
employees engaged in interstate commerce. 5 Where there is a
conflict between state and federal legislation or regulation, the
state legislation must yield.",
As was said in the preceding section, Congress cannot, either
directly or indirectly through the Commission, prescribe the
hours of service of those employees of an interstate carrier who
engage only in intrastate commerce; but if any employee is en-
gaged in the transportation of both intra- and interstate com-
merce, he is subject to the provisions of the federal Act.
Safety of Equipment-Congress has also directed the Inter-
state Commerce Commission to establish reasonable require-
ments with reference to the "safety of operation and equip-
ment. 18 7 This provision also applies to common carriers, con-
tract carriers, the carriers otherwise exempted, and "if need
therefor is found," to private carriers as well.
It has long been settled that the law-making bodies may enact
legislation affecting a carrier's equipment, which legislation is
conducive to safety or relates to a new method of affording
greater protection.8
The Interstate Commerce Commission has issued regulations
governing the equipment of motor vehicles, which specify the
number, character and location of head lamps, tail lamps, clear-
ance lamps, side-marker lamps, brakes, safety glass, windshield
wiper, rear-vision mirror, horn, fuel intake pipe, gasoline tank,
couplers for trailers, fire extinguisher, red lantern, red flag, tire
chains, flares, fuses, first-aid kit, hand axe, etc., and also provides
the qualifications of drivers, the manner in and speed at which
they must drive, the manner of stopping, parking, fueling, etc.8 9
Management-The Commission is also authorized "to inquire
85. Second Employers' Liability Cases (1912) 223 U. S. 1, 32 S. Ct. 169,
56 L. ed. 327.
86. Erie Ry. Co. v. New York (1914) 233 U. S. 671, 34 S. Ct. 756, 58
L. ed. 1149.
87. Sec. 204(a) (1-3).
88. Napier v. Atlantic C. L. Ry. Co. (1926) 272 U. S. 605, 47 S. Ct. 207,
71 L. ed. 432 (automatic firedoor and cab curtains); Pennsylvania Ry. Co.
v. Public Service Commission (1919) 250 U. S. 566, 40 S. Ct. 36, 63 L. ed.
1142 (caboose cars); Atlantic C. L. Ry. Co. v. Georgia (1914) 234 U. S.
280, 34 S. Ct. 829, 58 L. ed. 1312; New York, N. H., & H. Ry. Co. v. New
York (1897) 165 U. S. 628, 17 S. Ct. 418, 41 L. ed. 853.
89. Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (1936) 1 M. C. C. 1.
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into the organization of motor carriers * * * and into the man-
agement of their business, to keep itself informed as to the
manner and method in which the same is conducted."00 This
language is almost identical with that used in section 12 (1) of
the Interstate Commerce Act relating to railroads. 91 Construing
that act the Supreme Court has held that the utility generally
has the right to manage its "important interests upon the same
principles which are recognized as sound, and adopted in other
trades and pursuits ;92 that this section was enacted "in order
that the Commission may know just how the business is car-
ried on, with a view to regulating that which is confessedly
within its power;""11 "that the investigating and supervising
powers of the Commission extend to all of the activities of car-
riers and to all sums expended by them which could affect in
any way their benefit or burden as agents of the public;"04 but
that the Commission is in no sense a general manager.9
VII. ISSUANCE OF THE CERTIFICATE OR PERMIT
The Federal Motor Carrier Act provides that no common car-
rier by motor vehicle shall engage in interstate commerce on any
highway without first procuring from the Interstate Commerce
Commission a certificate of public convenience and necessity;"°
nor shall any contract carrier so engage without first procuring
a permit from the Commission.
7
Both of these sections contain "grandfather" clauses, i. e.,
clauses providing that if a common carrier applicant or its
predecessor in interest was in bona fide operation on June 1,
1935, and has operated continuously since that time, 8 except as
to interruptions of service over which it or its predecessor had
90. Sec. 204(a) (7).
91. (1887) 24 Stat. 383, 49 U. S. C. A. sec. 12(1).
92. Southern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1906)
200 U. S. 536, 26 S. Ct. 330, 50 L. ed. 585; Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry.
Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1896) 162 U. S. 184, 16 S. Ct.
700, 40 L. ed. 935.
93. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co. (1912)
224 U. S. 194, 32 S. Ct. 436, 56 L. ed. 729.
94. Smith v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1917) 245 U. S. 33, 38
S. Ct. 30, 32, 62 L. ed. 135.
95. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago G. W. Ry. Co. (1908)
209 U. S. 108, 28 S. Ct. 493, 52 L. ed. 705.
96. Sec. 206(a).
97. Sec. 209 (a).
98. Henry R. Butcher application (1937) 1 M. C. C. 485.
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no control," the Commission shall issue such certificate without
further proof that public convenience and necessity will be served
by such operation; the same is true of the issuance of permits
to contract carriers, except that the date is July 1, 1935. In both
instances, however, the common or contract carrier lost its
"grandfather" rights unless it applied for a certificate or permit
within 120 days after the Act became effective. 00
'Congress intended to provide for a rather summary disposition
of applications under the "grandfather" clauses.1 If operations
were discontinued for a period of time because of lack of traffic,
the applicant lost his "grandfather" rights. 2 Where the fact
of actual operations was shown, the Commission assumed that
they were bona fide unless the contrary was shown ;3 however,
where the character and scope of the applicant's operations were
questioned, the allegations of the application or self-serving state-
ments of the applicant were not alone accepted as proof, but
documentary evidence, such as bills of lading, receipts or sup-
porting testimony of witnesses familiar with the applicant's oper-
ations, were necessary,4 the burden being upon the applicant.5
But it was not necessary for the applicant to show that it actu-
ally had transported a shipment to each point involved in its ap-
plication on the statutory date, if it had been and was engaged in
transporting to those points before and after the statutory date.
As the Commission has put it, the question was "What was the
extent of the transportation business honestly and openly carried
on by the carrier as of that date?"' On the other hand a mere
holding out, or an offer, to operate on the statutory date was held
not to be the equivalent of bona fide operation.7 So, one whose ac-
tual operations were confined to the transportation of a particular
commodity was not entitled to "grandfather" rights as to all com-
modities merely because he held himself out to carry all freight
offered, such holding out not being equivalent to bona fide opera-
99. Benjamin Franklin application (1936) 1 M. C. C. 97.
100. Godfrey F. Wooten application (1937) 1 M. C. C. 489.
1. Earl W. Slagle application (1937) 2 M. C. C. 127; H. E. Stuck appli-
cation (1937) 2 M. C. C. 459.
2. Pennsylvania Bus Company application (1937) 2 M. C. C. 278.
3. Earl W. Slagle application (1937) 2 M. C. C. 127, 142.
4. Morris B. Bernstein application (1937) 2 M. C. C. 95.
5. Old Colony Coach Lines (1937) 2 M. C. C. 205, 208.
6. George Cassens & Sons application (1937) 1 M. C. C. 771.
7. Morris S. Bernstein application (1937) 2 M. C. C. 95; Crescent Trans-
fer Company application (1937) 2 M. C. C. 313.
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ation ;8 and where a carrier operated daily service for the trans-
portation of certain commodities, the handling of one or two
shipments a month of other commodities was not considered con-
tinuous operation as to the latter.9 The carriage of freight in
truck loads was insufficient to support an application to transport
less than truck loads. 0 Nor did the fact that the applicant had
operated in intrastate commerce entitle it to interstate rights
under the "grandfather" clause.'"
The Act contains a proviso that its provisions shall not be
construed to require a carrier engaged in operations solely within
a state to obtain a certificate to continue transportation of inter-
state commerce between places within such state if the state
board has granted it a certificate to do so.1 2 The purpose of this
proviso was to relieve such carriers of the burden of obtaining
duplicate certificates. 3
It is expressly stated that no certificate shall confer any pro-
prietary or property rights in the-use of the public highways.'4
This means that all carriers must observe all valid regulations
and restrictions of the states respecting the use of the highways
and the granting of a certificate or permit does not relieve them
of the obligation. 5
All common and contract carriers who do not come under the
provisions of the "grandfather" clause, must, in order to obtain
a certificate or permit, prove to the satisfaction of the Commis-
sion that he or it "is fit, willing, and able properly to perform the
service" proposed "and to conform to the provisions" of the
Act and the requirements, rules and regulations specified there-
under.15' In the case of common carriers it must further be
shown that the proposed service "is or will be required by the
present or future public convenience and necessity" ;", in the case
of contract carriers it need only be shown that the proposed
8. Great Lakes Cart. Co. application (1937) 2 M. C. C. 119; Crescent
Transfer Company application (1937) 2 M. C. C. 313.
9. Old Colony Coach Lines (1937) 2 M. C. C. 205, 208.
10. S. C. Dunbar application (1937) 2 M. C. C. 577, 580.
11. J. B. Nelson application (1936) 1 M. C. C. 285.
12. Sec. 206(a).
13. Motor Carrier Insurance (1936) 1 M. C. C. 45.
14. Sec. 207.
15. Jason W. House application (1936) 1 M. C. C. 125.
15a. Sec. 209(b).
16. Sec. 207(a). Pan-American Bus Lines application (1936) 1 M. C. C.
190, 201.
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service "will be consistent with the public interest and the policy
declared in Section 202.''
The Commission has held that a lack of knowledge of the law
or violations of the law must be considered in determining the
fitness of an applicant, but such lack of knowledge or violations
is not an absolute bar to the granting of a certificate or permit."8
Other matters to be considered are the applicant's experience as
an operator of a public transportation service,19 and his financial
ability to conduct the operations. 20
As has been stated-common carriers must also show that
their proposed service is or will be required by the present or
future public convenience and necessity. A finding to that effect
by the Commission is a prerequisite to the issuance of a certifi-
cate.21 "Necessity" does not mean an absolute necessity; the
question is whether the new operation will serve a useful public
demand or need, whether the need can be supplied as well by
existing carriers, and whether the proposed service will endanger
the operations of existing carriers contrary to the public inter-
est.2 2 The evidence must show that there is a definite need for
the proposed operation, or that the service proposed is of a spe-
cial character peculiarly adapted to the transportation of certain
commodities and that similar service is not offered by other car-
riers operating between the same points.23 Where the evidence
is that the existing facilities and service of rail and other motor
carriers amply provide for the public convenience and necessity
a certificate will not be granted.24 The burden is on the applicant
17. Sec. 209(b). Basetti & Lawson application (1936) 1 M. C. C. 187,
189; Jason W. House application (1937) 1 M. C. C. 727.
18. Garritson & Gulerr application (1937) 1 M. C. C. 751; Frank C.
Dehl application (1936) 1 M. C. C. 151; A. P. Shipwash application (1937)
1 M. C. C. 710; Leatham Bros. application (1937) 2 M. C. C. 639; Harry
Podolsky application (1937) 2 M. C. C. 653.
19. A. P. Shipwash application (1937) 1 M. C. C. 710; Ohio Valley Bus
Co. (1936) 1 M. C. C. 39; Joseph A. O'Neal application (1936) 1 M. C. C.
71.
20. Ritz Arrow Lines (1936) 1 M. C. C. 339; Edward M. Masher appli-
cation (1937) 1 M. C. C. 483; Crozier Bros. application (1936) 1 M. C. C.
301; T. J. McBroom application (1937) 1 M. C. C. 425.
21. Paul Beatty application (1936) 1 M. C. C. 141, 145; Basetti &
Lanson application (1936) 1 M. C. C. 187, 189; Godfrey F. Wooten appli-
cation (1937) 1 M. C. C. 489.
22. Pan-American Bus Lines (1936) 1 M. C. C. 199, 202.
23. Fenton C. Whipple application (1937) 2 M. C. C. 59.
24. Albert J. Hebert application (1936) 1 M. C. C. 121; Clarence L.
Davis application (1936) 1 M. C. C. 68; Ritz Arrow Lines (1937) 1 M. C. C.
839.
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to prove that the existing service does not satisfy the public
necessity and convenience and that that proposed will improve
the condition.2 5
Similarly, contract carriers must establish that the granting
of a permit to them "will be consistent with the public interest
and the policy declared" in the Act.2 5 In the absence of evidence
that the proposed operation will adversely affect other carriers,
a permit will be issued.2 6 "Consistent with the public interest"
has been construed to mean "not contradictory or hostile to the
public interest.' '26aSection 210 of the Act provides that no carrier shall at the
same time hold a certificate as a common carrier and a permit
as a contract carrier over the same route or within the same
territory unless the Commission finds that such certificate and
permit may be held consistently with the policy declared in the
Act. The Commission construes this to mean that where the two
services are not competitive and each is for a different class of
shippers, dual operation is consistent with the policy of the Act.2 7
VIII. CONSOLIDATION AND MERGER
Section 213 makes it unlawful (a) for two or more motor car-
riers to consolidate or merge their properties into one corpora-
tion for ownership, management or operation, or (b) for one
or more to purchase, lease or contract to operate the properties
of another, or (c) for one or more to acquire control of another
through purchase of its stock, or (d) for any person to acquire
control of two or more through ownership of their stock, or (e)
for any person who has control of one or more to acquire control
of another through ownership of its stock, or (f) for a carrier
by railroad, express or water to consolidate or merge with or
acquire control of any motor carrier or to contract to operate
its properties, unless, after application filed and hearing thereon,
the Commission shall find that to do so "will be consistent with
the public interest." There is a proviso that if a carrier other
than a motor carrier makes such an application the Commission
shall not enter an order of approval "unless it finds that the
25. John J. Norton application (1936) 1 M. C. C. 114.
25a. See. 209(b).-
26. Jason W. House application (1937) 1 M. C. C. 727.
26a. Scott Bros. application (1937) 2 M. C. C. 155, 164.
27. J. F. Nelson application (1936) 1 M. C. C. 285, 290.
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transaction proposed will promote the public interest by enabling
such carrier other than a motor carrier to use such motor carrier
service to public advantage in its operations and will not unduly
restrain competition."
These provisions of the Motor Carrier Act have not been con-
strued by the Commission or the courts; but in construing simi-
lar provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act relating to rail-
roads, it has been held that "Congress intended to permit unified
operation, even if involving the elimination of competition, where
this would be in the public interest."28 It was further held that
the burden is upon the applicant to make an affirmative showing
that the terms, conditions and considerations of acquisition and
control are just and reasonable.2 9 The intention of Congress was
to make possible the consolidation of carrier properties for the
primary purpose of reducing the cost of operation by removing
waste, from which in turn the public would profit through rate
reductions and more efficient service.30
In construing a provision similar to (b), above, the Supreme
Court has held it to be within the power of the Commission to
make a condition of its order that certain through rates be main-
tained in order that competition be preserved. 31 It is the duty
of the Commission to protect both the public and private inter-
ests. Thus, although it finds the acquisition will be in the public
interest, it may not approve the lease unless it further finds that
the consideration, terms and conditions thereof are just and
reasonable.32
Clause (c) above has been interpreted to require the Commis-
sion to consider the terms and conditions of the proposed pur-
chase and their effect upon the ability of the carrier to serve the
public 3
In enacting the afore-mentioned proviso Congress, no doubt,
had railroads in mind. In such cases the evidence must show, not
only that what is proposed is consistent with the public interest,
28. In re Valley Terminal Railroad (1920) 65 I. C. C. 105, 109.
29. Nickel Plate Unification (1926) 105 I. C. C. 425, 442.
80. State of Texas v. United States (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1934) 6 F. Supp.
63, 65.
31. Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. United States (1932) 284 U. S. 288, 52 S. Ct.
171, 76 L. ed. 278.
32. Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Jackson (C. C. A. 6, 1927) 22 F.
(2d) 509.
33. Control of Big Four by New York Central (1922) 72 I. C. C. 96.
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but that it will actively promote public interest by enabling the
acquiring carrier to use motor service to public advantage in its
operations.34
In paragraph (e) of section 213 it is provided that where the
total number of motor vehicles involved is not more than twenty,
authority of the commission is not required to consolidate, merge,
purchase, lease or acquire control, unless the applicant is a car-
rier other than a motor carrier or a person who is controlled by
a railroad company. This paragraph was enacted to enable small
operators to get together "without the necessity of going through
a great deal of red tape with the Commission."35
Paragraph (b) of the same section provides that "the carriers
and any person affected by any order made under" section 213
shall be "relieved from the operation of the 'anti-trust laws'."
IX. SECURITIES, INDEBTEDNESS, AND FINANCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY
Section 214 of the Act provides that common and contract car-
riers and those authorized to acquire control of any such, shall
be subject to the security provisions of the Interstate Commerce
Act, except where the par value of the securities to be issued,
together with the par value of the securities then outstanding,
does not exceed $500,000. The security provisions of the Inter-
state Commerce Act make it unlawful to issue shares of capital
stock, bonds or other evidences of indebtedness or to assume lia-
bility as lessor, lessee, guarantor, indorser, surety or otherwise,
even though permitted by the authority creating the carrier,
unless and until approved by the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion.35' The Commission is directed to make such authorization
only if it finds that it "is for some lawful object within its cor-
porate purposes, and compatible with the public interest, which
is necessary or appropriate for or consistent with the proper
performance by the carrier of service to the public-and which
will not impair its ability to perform that service and is reason-
ably necessary and appropriate for such purpose."
It has been held that under these provisions the Commission
has authority to determine the equity over underlying bonds, to
34. Pennsylvania Truck Lines (1936) 1 M. C. C. 101, 109; Greyhound
Mergers (1936) 1 M. C. C. 342, 351.
35. (1935) 79 Cong. Rec. 5655.
35a. (1887) 41 Stat. 494, 49 U. S. C. A. see. 20(a).
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examine the cash consideration going into the same, and to pass
upon the reasonableness of the items of expense deductible there-
from ;6 that the conservation of the credit of carriers is a matter
of public interest and therefore it is proper to require that bonds
issued be used only in connection with the provision of funds
for keeping carrier properties in operation, meeting fixed
charges, and otherwise maintaining credit ;37 and that a carrier
should be permitted to capitalize only those assets that have been
provided and are intended for continued productive use in the
service of transportation and that a substantial surplus should
remain uncapitalized as a support for credit and other pur-
poses. 8 It has also been held that the fact that the carrier has
capitalizable assets in sufficient amount to support an increase
in securities, does not, of itself justify such increase, that the
prospect of increased earnings and the improvement in ratio of
stock to funded debt, are not to be taken as controlling factors;
but that the necessity for the proposed issue must be demon-
strated and the terms upon which it is to be sold must be found
reasonable.39
Another portion of the same section 9 provides that the above
mentioned provisions shall not apply to notes maturing not more
than two years after the date and aggregating (together with
all other then outstanding notes of a maturity of two years or
less) not more than five per cent of the par value of its securi-
ties then outstanding; but within ten days after the making of
such notes a certificate of notification must be filed with the Com-
mission setting forth the same matters as are required in respect
of applications for authority to issue other securities. This pro-
vision is a recognition of the necessity of leaving to carriers a
certain leeway to enable them to quickly and easily meet current
financial exigencies.40
The jurisdiction of the Commission over the issuance of securi-
36. Chicago M., St. P. & P. R. Co. v. United States (D. C. N. D. Ill.
1929) 33 F. (2d) 583, 587.
37. Chesapeake & Ohio R. R. notes (1931) 180 I. C. C. 699.
38. Roscoe S. & P. R. R. (1931) 170 I. C. C. 403, 405; Securities of
Louisville & N. R. R. (1923) 76 I. C. C. 718, 720; Missouri Pacific R. R.
bonds (1932) 180 I. C. C. 352, 354.
39. Control of Erie R. R. (1928) 138 I. C. C. 517, 530.
39a. Sec. 214(9).
40. Bonds of Baltimore & 0. R. R. (1921) 67 I. C. C. 10; Notes of New
York C. & St. L. R. R. (1927) 131 I. C. C. 579.
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ties is exclusive and plenary and a carrier may issue securities
and assume obligations, when authorized by the Commission
without securing approval of any other body and without being
hampered by state action or restriction.41 But any security is-
sued or any obligation or liability assumed without the authori-
zation of the Commission is declared by the Act to be void.4 1"
Under this paragraph qualifying shares issued to comply with
state laws relating to directors, are void if not authorized by the
Commission. 42
Section 215 of the Act provides that no certificate or permit
shall be issued to a common or a contract carrier until the car-
rier shall comply with such reasonable rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe governing the filing of surety
bonds, policies of insurance or qualifications as a self-insurer
conditioned to pay any final judgment for bodily injuries or death
of any person resulting from the negligent operation of their
motor vehicles and for loss and damage to property. And it pro-
vides that the Commission may also, in its discretion, require
a surety bond, policy of insurance or qualifications as a self-in-
surer conditioned upon the making of compensation to shippers
for loss or damage to freight transported. The Commission has
prescribed rules and regulations on the subject specifying a
minimum of $5000 per vehicle for bodily injuries to one person
and a maximum varying with the capacity of the busses, and also
a minimum of $1000 for loss of or damages to property. As to
common carriers it also requires security to cover the cargo. In
case of a surety company bond it is required that the surety
company be one approved by the United States Treasury De-
partment. To qualify as a self-insurer, the carrier must show
its ability to satisfy obligations of the character covered by the
Act, without affecting the stability or permanency of its busi-
ness. 48 It has been held that the enactment of this section super-
sedes all state laws on the subject.44
41. Sec. 214(7). See in this connection, New York Central Sec. Corp. v.
United States (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1931) 54 F. (2d) 122, 126.
41a. Sec. 214(11).
42. Gulf M. & N. R. R. (1932) 189 I. C. C. 143, 145.
43. North Side Bus Company (1937) 1 M. C. C. 619; H. B. Church Truck
Service Co. (1936) 1 M. C. C. 265, 267; Consolidated Motor Lines Inc.
(1937) 1 M. C. C. 643, 646.
44. University Overland Exp. v. Alsop (1937) 122 Conn. 275, 189 At].
458.
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It is settled that legislation of this character, to protect the
public against injuries through the operation of motor vehicles
by common, contract and even private carriers, is valid.45
X. RATES, PREFERENCES AND DISCRIMINATIONS
Section 216 (a) of the Act provides that every motor common
carrier shall establish reasonable through routes and joint rates,
fares and charges with other motor common carriers for the
transportation of passengers; that in connection with such joint
fares they shall establish equitable divisions thereof. It also
requires them to provide safe and adequate service, equipment
and facilities. It also requires them to establish just and reason-
able regulations and practices relating to such joint rates and
to the carriage of baggage.
Sub-paragraph (c) of the same section provides that motor
common carriers may,-but are not required to-establish
through routes and joint fares with common carriers by rail-
road or water. They may also-but are not required to-estab-
lish through routes and joint rates with one another and with
carriers by railroad, express or water for the transportation of
property; if such through routes and joint rates are established
they are required to establish equitable divisions thereof.
The Supreme Court has held that Congress has power to
authorize the Commission to require common carriers to estab-
lish through routes4 'I but that a finding that through routes "are
necessary in the public interest" is essential to the validity of
such an order.41b
The public is only entitled to "reasonable" service45 and has
no right to insist upon wasteful or expensive service." It is the
general duty of a common carrier to receive and carry, by suit-
able means, goods which it holds itself out to carry, but where
45. Smith v. Cahoon (1931) 283 U. S. 553, 51 S. Ct. 582, 75 L. ed. 1264;
Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring (1932) 286 U. S. 352, 52 S. Ct. 595,
76 L. ed. 1155; Sprout v. South Bend (1928) 277 U. S. 163, 48 S. Ct. 502,
505, 72 L. ed. 833.
45a. St. Louis S. W. R. R. v. United States (1917) 245 U. S. 136, 38
S. Ct. 49, 62 L. ed. 199.
45b. Virginian R. R. v. United States (1926) 272 U. S. 658, 47 S. Ct.
222, 225, 70 L. ed. 242.
45c. Alexander Sprunt & Son v. United States (1930) 281 U. S. 249,
50 S. Ct. 315, 74 L. ed. 832.
46. Atchison T. & S. F. R. R. v. United States (1914) 232 U. S. 199,
34 S. Ct. 290, 58 L. ed. 568.
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articles of an extraordinary character are offered it is not bound
to provide facilities or equipment of a kind different from those
in general use.47
What is a reasonable rate requires the consideration of a num-
ber of elements, such as the type and amount of business,48 the
care required and risk assumed in transporting particular traffic,
and the value of the service;45 it shall not be greater than the
value of the service rendered.
The Act makes it unlawful for any motor common carrier to
give or cause any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage
or to subject any person, locality or description of traffic to any
unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice
or disadvantage. It does not prohibit all apparent discrimina-
tions but only such as are unjust or unreasonable.50 The prohibi-
tion is directed against undue discrimination or undue preference
arising from the voluntary and wrongful act of a carrier-not
such as are the result of conditions wholly beyond the control of
the carrier.5' A difference in rates cannot be held illegal unless
it is shown that it is not justified by a difference in the cost of the
respective services, by their value, or by other transportation
conditions. 52 The Act does not require that the rates of all car-
riers or over all routes shall be the same. 3 But an advantage
accorded by special agreement which affects the value of the
service to the shipper or the cost to the carrier is unlawful.5 4
In establishing their rates the carriers may take into considera-
47. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R. Co. v. Lawton Ref. Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1918)
253 Fed. 705; United States v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. (1916) 242 U. S. 208,
37 S. Ct. 95, 61 L. ed. 251.
48. Smyth v. Ames (1898) 169 U. S. 466, 540, 18 S. Ct. 418, 42 L. ed.
819.
49. Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. North Dakota (1915) 236 U. S. 585, 35
S. Ct. 429, 59 L. ed. 735.
50. Interstate Cominerce Commission v. Baltimore & 0. R. R. Co. (1892)
145 U. S. 263, 276, 12 S. Ct. 844, 36 L. ed. 699; Nashville, C. & St. L.
R. R. Co. v. State (1923) 262 U. S. 318, 43 S. Ct. 583, 67 L. ed. 999; United
States v. Illinois C. R. R. Co. (1924) 263 U. S. 515, 44 S. Ct. 189, 68 L. ed.
417.
51. Eastern Tenn. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1901)
181 U. S. 1, 18, 21 S. Ct. 516, 45 L. ed. 719.
52. United States v. Illinois C. R. R. Co. (1924) 263 U. S. 515, 44 S. Ct.
189, 68 L. ed. 417.
53. W. P. Brown v. Louisville & N. R. R. Co. (1937) 299 U. S. 393, 57
S. Ct. 265, 81 L. ed. 198.
54. Chicago & A. R. R. Co. v. Kirby (1912) 225 U. S. 155, 165, 32 S. Ct.
648, 56 L. ed. 1033; Chesapeake & 0. R. R. v. Westinghouse (1926) 270
U. S. 260, 46 S. Ct. 220, 70 L. ed. 576.
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tion competition with other carriers ;55 but if by agreement among
carriers competition is suppressed at a given point, that fact
would be proper to consider in determining the question of undue
discrimination ;5 they may not adjust their rates with the motive
of injuring or aiding a shipper, a particular kind of traffic, or a
locality.57
The law does not attempt to equalize fortune, opportunity,
abilities" or location.59 Whether, in a particular instance, undue
or unreasonable prejudice, preference or advantage exists, is a
question of fact within the primary and original jurisdiction of
the Commission; 60 no jurisdiction to pass upon such questions
has been conferred upon the courts.8 1 Under the Interstate Com-
merce Act relating to railroads the Commission has power to
order the removal of discrimination caused by low intrastate
rates-even though state-made; but the Motor Carrier Act ex-
pressly provides that it does not empower the Commission to
prescribe or regulate intrastate charges "for the purpose of
removing discrimination or for any other purpose whatever. ' ' 61*
XI. COMMISSION HEARINGS AND INVESTIGATIONS
The Act provides that any person, state board, organization
or body politic may file a complaint with the Commission attack-
ing any rate, fare, charge, classification, rule, regulation or prac-
tice as being in violation of the law.61b When the interests of a
55. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago G. W. R. R. Co. (1908)
209 U. S. 108, 119, 28 S. Ct. 493, 52 L. ed. 705; Texas & P. R. R. Co. v.
United States (1933) 289 U. S. 627, 53 S. Ct. 768, 77 L. ed. 1410.
56. Interstate Com. Com. v. Louisville & N. R. R. Co. (1903) 190 U. S.
273, 23 S. Ct. 687, 47 L. ed. 1047.
57. Interstate Com. Com. v. Chicago G. W. R. R. Co. (1908) 209 U. S.
108, 28 S. Ct. 493, 52 L. ed. 705.
58. Interstate Com. Com. v. Diffenbaugh (1911) 222 U. S. 42, 46, 32
S. Ct. 22, 56 L. ed. 83.
59. United States v. Baltimore & 0. R. R. Co. (1913) 231 U. S. 274, 34
S. Ct. 75, 58 L. ed. 218; United States v. Illinois C. R. Co. (1924) 263 U. S.
515, 44 S. Ct. 189, 68 L. ed. 417.
60. Cincinnati N. 0. & T. P. R. R. Co. v. Interstate Com. Com. (1896)
162 U. S. 184, 16 S. Ct. 700, 40 L. ed. 935; Interstate Com. Com. v. Ala-
bama M. R. Co. (1897) 168 U. S. 144, 18 S. Ct. 45, 42 L. ed. 414; Simpson
v. Shepard (1913) 230 U. S. 352, 33 S. Ct. 729, 57 L. ed. 1511; Manufac-
turers Ry. v. United States (1918) 246 U. S. 457, 38 S. Ct. 383, 62 L. ed.
831; Nashville C. St. L. Hy. v. State (1923) 262 U. S. 318, 43 S. Ct. 583,
67 L. ed. 999.
61. Pennsylvania Ry. Co. v. International C. M. Co. (1913) 230 U. S.
184, 33 S. Ct. 893, 57 L. ed. 1446.
61a. See. 216(f).
61b. Sec. 304(d).
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state are concerned, it, as well as a private individual, may file a
complaint with the commission ;6 2 as may also a voluntary asso-
ciation of merchants organized for their mutual benefit.6 ' If,
after hearing upon a complaint or in an investigation on its own
initative, the Commission find that any rate, fare or charge, or
any classification, rule, regulation or practice is or will be unjust,
discriminatory or unduly preferential it shall prescribe the law-
ful rate, fare or charge, or the maximum or minimum rate, fare,
or charge or the lawful classification, rule, regulation or practice
thereafter to be made effective and observed and may, when
deemed by it to be necessary or desirable in the public interest,
establish through routes and joint rates, fares, charges, regula-
tions or practices.
The Commission is an administrative body and is not hamp-
ered by the hard and fast rules of pleading and practice which
prevail in courts of law.64
The simplest of pleadings is sufficient to invoke its action.65
Where one applied for a permit as a contract carrier but the Com-
mission found the service rendered by it to be a common carrier
service, it granted a certificate of convenience and necessity
rather than deny the application, require the filing of a new
application and put him and the other parties to the expense and
vexation of another hearing.6 6 There is nothing in the Act to
justify limiting the power of the Commission to either a grant
or denial in toto of the precise relief applied for. 7
Nor is the Commission hampered by the strict and narrow
rules of evidence that prevail in courts.68 The admission of evi-
dence which, under the rules applicable to judicial hearings,
would be deemed incompetent, does not invalidate an order of
62. United States v. New York C. R. R. Co. (1926) 272 U. S. 457, 47
S. Ct. 130, 71 L. ed. 350; State Highway Dept. v. Director General (1922)
69 I. C. C. 220.
63. California C. Ass'n v. Wells Fargo & Co. (1921) 16 I. C. C. 458, 462.
64. United States v. Delaware & H. R. Corp. (App. D. C. 1931) 51 F.(2d) 429; Akron, C. & Y. R. Co. v. United States (D. C. W. D. N. Y. 1927)
22 F. (2d) 199, 202.
65. Arcadia Mills v. Carolina, C. & 0. R. Co. (D. C. W. D. S. C. 1922)
293 Fed. 639.
66. Drexel C. Tucker application (1937) 2 M. C. C. 335.
67. United States v. Merchants & M. T. Ass'n (1916) 242 U. S. 178, 37
S. Ct. 24, 61 L. ed. 233.
68. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird (1904) 194 U. S. 25, 44,
24 S. Ct. 563, 48 L. ed. 860.
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the Commission;69 but the Commission cannot disregard all rules
of evidence and capriciously make findings by administrative
fiat.7° All parties must be afforded a full and fair hearing, with
opportunity to introduce evidence, cross examine witnesses and
inspect documents offered in evidence.71 A finding without evi-
dence is arbitrary and baseless, and orders of the Commission
are void if a hearing was denied, if that granted was inadequate
or manifestly unfair, if the finding was contrary to the undis-
putable character of the evidence or if the facts do not, as a
matter of law, support the order made.7 2 Where an existing rate
is attacked the burden is on the complainant to establish that it is
unreasonable in fact ;73 this burden cannot be sustained by cate-
gorical answers, where a witness may, in terms, testify that the
goods were worth so much per pound, or the services worth so
much per day.
7 4
The Act gives the Commission power to prescribe just, reason-
able and equitable divisions of through rates as between the car-
riers parties thereto, if, after a hearing, it is of the opinion that
the existing divisions are or will be unjust, unreasonable, in-
equitable or prejudicial.7 5 A carrier may have joined in a through
rate because of the divisions accorded to it. To permit the com-
mission to change this arrangement as to past shipments would
be harsh if not unreasonable, and the Commission has been given
no such power.78 The Commission can prescribe future divisions
69. Western P. M. C. Co. v. United States (1926) 271 U. S. 268, 46 S. Ct.
500, 70 L. ed. 941; Beaumont S. L. & W. R. R. Co. v. United States (D. C.
W. D. Mo. 1929) 36 F. (2d) 789, 793.
70. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. R. Co. (1913)
227 U. S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 L. ed. 431.
71. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. R. Co., (1913)
227 U. S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 L. ed. 431; Akron C. & Y. R. Co. v. United
States (D. C. W. D. N. Y. 1927) 22 F. (2d) 199; Atchison T. & S. F.
R. R. Co. v. United States (1932) 284 U. S. 248, 52 S. Ct. 146, 76 L. ed.
1397.
72. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. R. (1913)
227 U. S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 L. ed. 431.
73. Louisville & N. I. R. Co. v. United States (1915) 238 U. S. 1, 35
S. Ct. 697, 59 L. ed. 1177.
74. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union P. R. R. Co. (1911) 222
U. S. 506, 549, 32 S. Ct. 114, 56 L. ed. 288.
75. Sec. 218(f).
76. Brimstone R. & C. Co. v. United States (1928) 276 U. S. 104, 48
S. Ct. 282, 72 L. ed. 487.
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only upon a finding, after a full hearing, that the divisions in
effect are unjust or unreasonable.7 7
The question of the reasonableness of divisions, like the ques-
tion of the reasonableness of rates, is one originally for the Com-
mission-and a determination by the Commission is a prereq-
uisite to the right to court relief.78 In passing on the question of
divisions the Commission must consider whether a particular
carrier is an originating, intermediate or delivering carrier. It
must also take into account the efficiency with which the several
carriers are operated, the amount of revenue required to pay
their respective operating expenses, taxes, and a fair return on
their respective investments, 7 and the importance to the public
of their respective transportation service. 80
XII. TARIFFS
Section 217 of the Act requires all motor common carriers to
file with the Commission and print, and keep open to public in-
spection, tariffs showing.all the rates, fares and charges, and all
services in connection therewith, between points on its own route,
and between points on its route and points on the routes of other
carriers with whom through routes and joint rates have been
established. Interstate transportation cannot be engaged in un-
til tariffs covering the service have been filed.80 ' All services to
be rendered must be provided for in the tariffs. Thus if a motor
carrier furnished C. 0. D. service, he must provide for its rendi-
tion by a rule in the tariff.81 Posting is not a condition to mak-
ing a tariff legally operative. 2 Such tariffs, when filed, have the
77. Beaumont S. L. & W. R. Co. v. United States (1930) 282 U. S. 74,
51 S. Ct. 1, 75 L. ed. 221; Baltimore & 0. R. R. Co. v. United States (1936)
298 U. S. 349, 56 S. Ct. 797, 80 L. ed. 1209.
78. Terminal R. R. Ass'n v. United States (1924) 366 U. S. 17, 45 S. Ct.
5, 69 L. ed. 150; Backus-Brooks Co. v. Northern P. R. R. Co. (C. C. A. 8,
1927) 21 F. (2d) 4, 16.
79. United States v. Abilene & So. R. R. (1924) 265 U. S. 274, 44 S. Ct.
565, 68 L. ed. 1016.
80. Akron C. & Y. R. R. v. United States (1923) 261 U. S. 184, 43 S. Ct.
270, 67 L. ed. 605.
80a. Southern R. R. v. Reed (1911) 222 U. S. 424, 32 S. Ct. 140, 56
L. ed. 257; Southern R. R. v. Burlington Lbr. Co. (1911) 225 U. S. 99,
32 S. Ct. 657, 56 L. ed. 1001.
81. Motor Carrier Insurance (1936) 1 M. C. C. 45, 52.
82. Texas & P. R. R. Co. v. Cisco Oil Mills (1906) 204 U. S. 449, 451,
27 S. Ct. 358, 51 L. ed. 562; Kansas City S. R. R. v. Albers (1911) 223
U. S. 573, 594, 32 S. Ct. 316, 56 L. ed. 556; United States v. Miller (1911)
223 U. S. 599, 604, 32 S. Ct. 323, 56 L. ed. 568; Kansas City S. R. R. v.
Carl (1912) 227 U. S. 639, 33 S. Ct. 391, 57 L ed. 683; American Exp. Co.
v. U. S. Horse S. Co. (1917) 244 U. S. 58, 63, 37 S. Ct. 595, 61 L. ed. 990.
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force and effect of a statute and as such are binding upon shipper
and carrier alikes 3 Their provisions may not be avoided, en-
larged or varied by contract.84
All shippers are conclusively presumed to have knowledge of
the provisions of the tariffs.8- Therefore neither the intentioned
nor accidental misstatement or misquotation of the applicable
published rate will bind the carrier or shipper.8 6 What construc-
tion or interpretation shall be given a tariff is a question of law.87
In case of ambiguity they should be construed most liberally in
favor of the shipper. 8 Effect is to be given, if possible, to every
word, clause and sentence,89 and in determining the meaning of
a part, resort may be had to other parts in order that the whole
may standY' The language must be construed fairly and reason-
83. Penn. R. R. v. International C. M. Co. (1902) 230 U. S. 184, 23
S. Ct. 893, 896, 57 L. ed. 1446; Chicago R. I. & P. R. R. Co. v. O'Connor
(1913) 232 U. S. 508, 34 S. Ct. 380, 383, 58 L. ed. 703; Pillsbury F. M.
Co. v. Great N. R. R. Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1928) 25 F. (2d) 66, 68; Updike
Grain Co. v. Chicago & N. W. R. R. (C. C. A. 8, 1929) 35 F. (2d) 486,
487; Union W. R. Co. v. Atchison T. & S. F. R. R. (C. C. A. 8, 1933) 66
F. (2d) 965, 967; Eagle C. 0. Co. v. Southern R. R. (D. C. S. D. Miss.
1931) 46 F. (2d) 1006, 1008; Chicago I. & L. R. R. v. International M.
Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1930) 43 F. (2d) 93, 95.
84. Armour P. Co. v. United States (1907) 209 U. S. 56, 80, 28 S. Ct.
28, 52 L. ed. 681; Central R. R. Co. v. U. S. P1. Co. (C. C. A. 3, 1924)
1 F. (2d) 866, 868; Dare v. New York C. R. Co. (C. C. A. 9, 1927) 20
F. (2d) 16, 18.
85. Chicago & A. R. R. Co. v. Kirby (1911) 225 U. S. 155, 166, 32 S. Ct.
648, 56 L. ed. 1033; Pittsburgh C. C. & St. L. R. R. v. Fink (1919) 250
U. S. 577, 40 S. Ct. 27, 63 L. ed. 1151; Kansas City S. R. R. v. Carl (1912)
227 U. S. 639, 33 S. Ct. 391, 57 L. ed. 683; Boston & Me. R. R. v. Hooker
(1913) 233 U. S. 97, 34 S. Ct. 526, 58 L. ed. 868; Louisville & N. R. R. v.
Maxwell (1914) 237 U. S. 94, 35 S. Ct. 494, 59 L. ed. 853; Atchison T. &
S. F. R. R. v. Robinson (1913) 233 U. S. 173, 180, 34 S. Ct. 556, 58 L. ed.
901.
86. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Henderson (1914) 237 U. S. 94, 35 S. Ct. 494,
59 L. ed. 853; Kansas City S. R. R. v. Carl (1912) 227 U. S. 639, 33 S. Ct.
391, 57 L. ed. 683; Boston & Me. R. R. v. Hooker (1913) 233 U. S. 97, 34
S. Ct. 526, 58 L. ed. 868; Louisville & N. R. R. v. Maxwell (1914) 237 U. S.
94, 35 S. Ct. 494, 59 L. ed. 853.
87. Great N. R. R. v. Merchants Elev. Co. (1921) 259 U. S. 285, 42
S. Ct. 477, 66 L. ed. 943.
88. Lothrop v. Spokane P. S. R. R. (D. C. D. Ore. 1926) 10 F. (2d)
225, 228; Updike Grain Co. v. Chicago N. W. By. (C. C. A. 8, 1929) 35
F. (2d) 486; Atlantic B. Co. v. Atlantic C. L. R. R. (D. C. S. D. Fla. 1932)
56 F. (2d) 163, 165; Southern P. R. R. v. Lathrop (C. C. A. 9, 1926) 15
F. (2d) 486.
89. Pillsbury F. M. Co. v. Great N. R. R. (C. C. A. 8, 1928) 25 F. (2d)
66, 69; Van Dusen Harrington Co. v. Northern P. R. R. (C. C. A. 8, 1929)
32 F. (2d) 466, 468; Chicago G. W. R. R. v. Farmers' S. Ass'n (C. C. A.
10, 1932) 59 F. (2d) 657, 659.
90. Pillsbury F. M. Co. v. Great N. R. R. (C. C. A. 8, 1928) 25 F. (2d)
66; Updike Grain Co. v. Chicago N. W. R. R. (C. C. A. 8, 1929) 35 F. (2d)
486.
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ably in accordance with the meaning of the words used and not
distorted or extended by strained construction.9 ' The intention
of the framers is competent only in so far as it is fairly expressed
in the language of the printed rates.9 2 Tariffs must not be made
cunningly devised nets in which to entangle unsuspicious or in-
experienced shippers.93 Where conflicting rates of equally specific
description are published, the shipper is entitled to the lower.9'
but where the commodity is listed in more than one tariff desig-
nation that which is more specific is applicable.95
The Act also provides that no change shall be made in any
rate, fare, charge or classification, or any rule, regulation or
practice affecting such, or the value of the service thereunder
until thirty days' notice of such change shall be published in a
tariff fied and posted pursuant to law, unless the commission,
in its discretion, for good cause shown, authorizes a shorter
notice. 951 Rates cannot be lawfully changed without the formali-
ties expressly enjoined by the Act.96 The power of the Commis-
sion to shorten the length of notice will not be exercised to aid
a carrier in any strategic endeavor, nor to aid shippers in any
ordinary commercial exigency. 7
The Act also provides that whenever a motor common carrier
files a new individual or joint rate, fare, charge or classification
or any rule, regulation or practice affecting such rate, fare or
charge or the value of the service to be rendered, the Commission
may enter upon a hearing concerning the lawfulness thereof, and
pending such hearing may suspend the operation for a desig-
nated period. A carrier is not to be denied the right to increase
91. Union W. R. Co. v. Atchinson T. & S. F. R. R. (C. C. A. 8, 1933)
66 F. (2d) 965, 967; Atlantic B. Co. v. Atlantic C. L. Ry. Co. (D. C. S. D.
Fla. 1932) 56 F. (2d) 163.
92. Great N. R. R. v. Delmar Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1930) 43 F. (2d) 780,
782.
93. Norfolk & S. R. R. v. Chatman (1916) 244 U. S. 276, 37 S. Ct. 499,
Si L. ed. 1131.
94. Commodity Rates, 1 M. M. C. 457, 460.
95. United States v. Gulf Ref. Co. (1924) 268 U. S. 542, 45 S. Ct. 597,
69 L. ed. 1082; American Ry. Exp. v. Price (C. C. A. 5, 1932) 54 F. (2d)
67.
95a. Sec. 217(c).
96. United States v. Standard Oil Co. (D. C. N. D. Ill. 1907) 148 Fed.
719, 721; American S. F. Co. v. Delaware L. & W. R. R. (C. C. A. 3, 1913)
207 Fed. 733, 741.
97. Acme Q. & P. R. R. v. St. Louis & S. F. R. R. (1912) 22 I. C. C.
283; Changes in Schedules (1931) 176 I. C. C. 217, 221.
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an unreasonably low rate merely because of the injurious conse-
quences which would arise to shippers from a change in the
rate.9 8 The mere fact that a rate has been increased carries with
it no presumption that it was not rightfully done.9 9 The Inter-
state Commerce Act, applicable to railroads, specifically imposes
upon the carrier the burden of justifying increased rates' 0° and
the courts hold that the burden is on them.' While there is no
similar provision in the Motor Carrier Act, it will likely be held
that the carrier also has the burden under that Act. On the
other hand, where a rate is reduced, the burden is on those who
oppose the reduction to show why it should not be permitted.2
In determining the reasonableness of any rate, fare or charge,
good will, earning power or the certificate under which the car-
rier is operating are not to be considered as elements of the value
of the property of the carrier, and in applying for and accepting
a certificate the carrier is deemed to have assented to this provi-
sion. 2' The Act specifically provides3 that in prescribing just and
reasonable rates for motor common carriers, the Commission
shall give due consideration
to the inherent advantages of transportation by such car-
riers; to the effect of rates upon the movement of traffic by
such carriers; to the need, in the public interest, of adequate
and efficient transportation service by such carriers at the
lowest cost consistent with the furnishing of such services;
and to the need of revenues sufficient to enable such carriers,
under honest, economical and efficient management, to pro-
vide such service.
Since common carriers undertake to serve the general public
they should be protected from contract carriers who take the
cream of the traffic and thus make it difficult for common car-
riers to continue their broader operations.'
98. McLean Lumber Co. v. United States (D. C. S. D. Tenn. 1916) 237
Fed. 460, 470.
99. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago G. W. R. R. (1907) 209
U. S. 108, 28 S. Ct. 493, 52 L. ed. 705.
100. Section 15(7).
1. Anchor Coal Co. v. United States (D. C. S. D. W. Va. 1928) 25 F.
(2d) 462, 474; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago G. W. R. R.
Co. (1907) 209 U. S. 108, 28 S. Ct. 493, 52 L. ed. 705.
2. Anchor Coal Co. v. United States (D. C. S. D. W. Va. 1928) 25 F.(2d) 462.
2a. Sec. 216(h).
3. Sec. 216(i).
4. Gollock application (1936) 1 M. C. C. 161, 165.
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The Act also specifically prohibits motor common carriers from
charging or collecting a larger, smaller or different compensation
for transportation than those specified in their tariffs, prohibits
them from refunding or remitting, in any manner or by any
device, directly or indirectly, any portion thereof, and prohibits
them from extending any privileges or facilities except such as
are specified in their tariffs.4' The purpose of these provisions of
the Act was to prohibit every method of dealing by which the
forbidden result could be brought about.5 Carriers may not
accept services, advertising, property or a release of claim for
damages, or anything but cash in payment for their transporta-
tion charges.6 Nor can a carrier render any other or different
service nor extend any privileges or facilities save those provided
for in its tariffs.7 Commissions cannot be paid to a forwarder
who is both consignor and consignee.8
When the consignee accepts a shipment he is liable for the
lawful charges9 although he acted only as agent of the shipper
and has accounted to the latter for the proceeds of the sale of
the shipment." This is true even though the consignor has since
become insolvent.1
The Act also prohibits the issuance of free tickets, free passes
or free transportation for passengers, except to its employees
and those of other carriers, and for specified charitable pur-
4a. Sec. 217(b).
5. New York N. H. & H. R. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission(1905) 200 U. S. 361, 26 S. Ct. 272, 50 L. ed. 515; Armour P. Co. v. United
States (1907) 209 U. S. 56, 72, 28 S. Ct. 428, 52 L. ed. 681.
6. Chicago N. W. R. R. Co. v. Lindell (1929) 281 U. S. 14, 50 S. Ct.
200, 74 L. ed. 670; Fullerton Lbr. Co. v. Chicago M. & St. P. R. R. (1930)
282 U. S. 520, 51 S. Ct. 227, 75 L. ed. 502; Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v.
Mottley (1910) 219 U. S. 467, 477, 31 S. Ct. 265, 55 L. ed. 297; Chicago
I. & L. . R. v. United States (1910) 219 U. S. 486, 496, 31 S. Ct. 272,-55
L. ed. 305; New York C. & H. R. R. v. Gray (1915) 239 U. S. 583, 36 S. Ct.
176, 60 L. ed. 451.
7. Southern R. R. v. Prescott (1915) 240 U. S. 632, 638, 36 S. Ct. 469, 60
L. ed. 836; Davis v. Henderson (1924) 266 U. S. 92, 45 S. Ct. 24, 69 L. ed.
182.
8. Lehigh V. R. R. v. United States (1916) 243 U. S. 444, 37 S. Ct. 434,
61 L. ed. 839.
9. Pittsburgh C. C. & St. L. R. R. v. Fink (1919) 250 U. S. 577, 40 S, Ct.
27, 63 L. ed. 1151; Louisville & N. R. R. v. Central I. & C. Co. (1923) 265
U. S. 59, 44 S. Ct. 441, 68 L. ed. 900.
10. New York C. & H. R. R. v. York & Whitney (1920) 256 U. S. 406,
41 S. Ct. 509, 65 L. ed. 1016; Central W. C. v. Chicago R. & P. R. R.
(C. C. A. 8, 1927) 20 F. (2d) 828.
11. Callaway v. Atchison T. & S. F. R. R. (C. C. A. 9, 1927) 35 F.
(2d) 319.
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poses. 11a It has been held that one riding on a vehicle at the
invitation of the person in charge, was doing so contrary to
law. 12
Contract carriers must file with the Commission, publish and
keep open for public inspection schedules, or, in the discretion
of the Commission, copies of their contracts, containing the
minimum, but not maximum charges for their services, and any
rule, regulation or practice affecting such charges or the value
of their services. No contract carrier shall demand, charge
or collect less compensation for its service than the schedule
charges; no reduction shall be made in any charge except after
thirty days' notice, unless the Commission authorize a shorter
notice. The Commission has power to suspend such reduced
rates for a designated period, pending a hearing and determina-
tion as to the lawfulness of the proposed change. 12" The prescrip-
tion of minimum rates is lawful as it has a definite tendency to
relieve the highways's and to promote and protect adequate and
efficient motor carrier service in the public interest by eliminat-
ing cut-throat competition.14
XIII. BILLS OF LADING
The Act makes all motor common carriers subject to the pro-
visions of section 20(11) of the Interstate Commerce Act,14a
which are: (a) Every common carrier shall issue a receipt or
bill of lading for freight transported and (b) where such prop-
erty is transported over connecting lines on a through bill of
lading, the issuing carrier shall be liable for all loss, damage or
injury to such property caused by it or any such connecting
carrier; (c) no bill of lading, rule, regulation or contract of any
character shall exempt any carrier from this liability; (d) any
such carrier so receiving property for transportation shall be
liable, whether a bill of lading has been issued or not, for the
full actual loss, damage or injury caused by it or any connecting
carrier, notwithstanding any limitation of liability or limitation
Ila. Sec. 222(c).
12. Illinois C. R. R. v. Messina (1915) 240 U. S. 395, 36 S. Ct. 368, 60
L. ed. 709.
12a. Sec. 216(g).
13. Stephenson & Binford (1932) 287 U. S. 251, 53 S. Ct. 181, 77 L. ed.
288.
14. Contracts of Contract Carriers (1937) 1 M. C. C. 628.
14a. (1887) 24 Stat. 879, 49 U. S. C. A. sec. 1 & 2.
19371
Washington University Open Scholarship
40 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 23
of the amount of recovery or agreement as to value in any bill
of lading, contract, rule, regulation or tariff. (e) The above pro-
visions do not apply to property concerning which the carrier
shall be expressly authorized by the commission to establish
rates upon a value declared in writing as the released value of
the property. (f) All actions instituted against a delivering car-
rier shall be instituted only on a District or a State through
which the carrier operates; (g) no carrier shall provide, by rule,
contract, regulation or otherwise that claims shall be filed within
a shorter period than nine months or that suits shall be instituted
within a shorter period than two years, such a period of two
years to be computed from the day when notice is given in
writing by the carrier to the claimant that the claim has been
disallowed.
The enactment of this law was an assertion of the power of
Congress over interstate shipments, the duty to issue bills of
lading, and the responsibilities thereunder which excludes state
action on the subject.'15 Congress has said that the initial carrier
shall be deemed to have adopted the connecting carrier or carriers
as its agent or agents and is liable throughout the entire move-
ment, and the through movement is to be governed by the same
rules of pleading, practice and presumption as would have ap-
plied had the shipment moved wholly between stations on the
route of the initial carrier. 6 The bill of lading issued by the
initial carrier governs the entire transportation and fixes the
obligations of all participating carriers. 7 Each connecting car-
rier, however, is bound only to safely carry over its own line and
deliver to the next connecting carrier or the consignee; its lia-
bility commences when it receives the shipment and ends when it
delivers safely to the next connecting carrier or to the consignee. 8
15. Atchison T. & S. F. R. R. v. Harold (1915) 241 U. S. 371, 36 S. Ct.
665, 60 L. ed. 1050.
16. Atlantic C. L. R. R. v. Riverside Mills (1911) 219 U. S. 186, 31 S. Ct.
164, 55 L. ed. 167; Norfolk & W. R. R. v. Dixie Tob. Co. (1912) 228 U. S.
593, 33 S. Ct. 609, 57 L. ed. 980; Missouri K. & T. R. R. v. Ward (1916)
244 U. S. 383, 37 S. Ct. 617, 61 L. ed. 1213; Galveston H. & S. A. R. R. v.
Wall (1915) 241 U. S. 87, 36 S. Ct. 493, 60 L. ed. 905.
17. Texas & P. R. R. v. Leatherwood (1919) 250 U. S. 478, 39 S. Ct.
517, 63 L. ed. 1096; Galveston Wh. Co. v. Galveston H. & S. A. R. R. (1932)
285 U. S. 127, 52 S. Ct. 342, 76 L. ed. 659.
18. Oregon-Washington R. & N. Co. v. McGinn (1922) 258 U. S. 409, 42
S. Ct. 332, 66 L. ed. 689.
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The constitutionality of this rule of liability has been upheld. 9
The provisions of this act may be asserted in state as well as in
federal courts.20
The liability imposed by clause (d) above is limited to "any
loss or damage caused by it" or any connecting carrier and
plainly implies a liability for some default in the duty of a com-
mon carrier.2 1 The carrier's liability is not dependent upon the
signing of a bill of lading by the shipper, as that is not essential.
22
The burden of proving that the loss resulted from some cause
for which the original carrier is not responsible in law, is upon
the carrier.23 Under clause (e) above, when a carrier files a
tariff containing two rates based upon the value of the article
shipped it is bound to apply that rate which corresponds to the
valuation stated by the shipper and when a shipper presents
freight and declares its value he is estopped from recovering any
greater amount.24
A carrier has the right to fix its charges somewhat in propor-
tion to the value of the property and responsibility assumed.25
This limitation of liability applies to actions for delay as well
as actions for loss and damage.2 6 Such limitations likewise re-
dound to the benefit of the connecting carriers.27 It is not neces-
sary that the tariffs be posted to give effect to the limitation of
liability.2 8 The publication of the rates and the limitation of
19. Atlantic C. L. R. R. v. Riverside Mills (1911) 219 U. S. 196, 31 S.
Ct. 164, 55 L. ed. 167; Galveston H. & S. A. R. R. v. Wallace (1912) 223
U. S. 481, 32 S. Ct. 205, 56 L. ed. 516.
20. Galveston H. & S. A. R. R. v. Wallace, supra.
21. Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger (1913) 226 U. S. 491, 33 S. Ct. 148,
57 L. ed. 314.
22. American R. R. Exp. v. Lindenburg (1923) 260 U. S. 584, 43 S. Ct.
206, 67 L. ed. 414.
23. Galveston H. & S. A. R. R. v. Wallace (1912) 223 U. S. 481, 32 S. Ct.
205, 56 L. ed. 516; Chicago R. I. & P. R. R. v. Collins (1919) 249 U. S.
186, 39 S. Ct. 189, 63 L. ed. 552.
24. Kansas City S. R. R. v. Carl (1913) 227 U. S. 639, 33 S. Ct. 39, 57
L. ed. 683.
25. Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger (1913) 226 U. S. 491, 33 S. Ct. 148,
57 L. ed. 314; Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Neiman-Marcus Co. (1913) 227 U. S.
469, 33 S. Ct. 267, 57 L. ed. 600; American Railway Exp. Co. v. Daniel
(1925) 269 U. S. 41, 46 S. Ct. 15, 70 L. ed. 154.
26. New York P. & N. R. h. v. Peninsula P. Exch. of Md. (1925) 240
U. S. 34, 36 S. Ct. 230, 60 L. ed. 511.
27. Kansas City So. R. R. v. Carl (1913) 227 U. S. 639, 33 S. Ct. 39,
57 L. ed. 683.
28. American Exp. Co. v. U. S. H. S. Co. (1917) 244 U. S. 58, 37 S. Ct.
595, 61 L. ed. 990.
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valuation applicable thereto is notice to the shipper, his knowl-
edge is presumed and lack of actual knowledge is no excuse.25
Nor will the intentional or accidental misstatement of the pro-
visions of the tariff by the carrier's agent bind either the carrier
or the shipper.3 0 The Commission has, by general order, author-
ized the establishment of released rates on various articles, such
as household goods, carpets and carpeting, ores, paintings and
pictures, pottery and silk.
With reference to clause (f) above, it is well settled that
notice of claim must be given in accordance with the provisions
of the bill of lading.3 1 Notice must be given in case of misde-
livery or conversion as well as in case of loss or damage . 2 A
provision of a bill of lading limiting the time within which to
file a claim is valid.33 This provision of the law is not itself a limi-
tation and in the absence of a limitation in the bill of lading the
state law applies ;34 a provision that suit be brought within two
years and a day after delivery or after a reasonable time for
delivery has expired, is valid. 5
XIV. REPORTS
By section 222(8) it is made unlawful for any motor carrier
to willfully fail or refuse to make a report to the Commission or
to refuse to keep accounts in the form and manner approved by
the Commission or to willfully falsify, destroy, mutilate or alter
any such report or accounts, or to file any false report or account,
29. Kansas City So. R. R. v. Carl (1913) 227 U. S. 639, 33 S. Ct. 39, 57
L. ed. 683; Missouri, K. & T. R. R. v. Harriman (1913) 227 U. S. 657, 33
S. Ct. 397, 57 L. ed. 690; Atchison T. & S. F. R. R. v. Robinson (1914) 233
U. S. 173, 34 S. Ct. 556, 58 L. ed. 901; American R. R. Exp. v. Daniel
(1925) 269 U. S. 41, 46 S. Ct. 15, 70 L. ed. 154.
30. Kansas City So. R. R. v. Carl, supra.
31. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. McLaughlin (1916) 242 U. S. 142, 37
S. Ct. 40, 61 L. ed. 207; St. Louis I. M. & S. R. R. v. Starbird (1917) 243
U. S. 592, 37 S. Ct. 462, 61 L. ed. 917; Southern P. Co. v. Stewart (1919)
248 U. S. 446, 39 S. Ct. 139, 63 L. ed. 350; Baltimore & 0. R. R. v. Leach
(1919) 249 U. S. 217, 39 S. Ct. 254, 63 L. ed. 570; Erie R. R. v. Shuart(1919) 250 U. S. 465, 39 S. Ct. 519, 63 L. ed. 1088; Barrett v. Van Pelt(1925) 268 U. S. 85, 45 S. Ct. 437, 69 L. ed. 857; Chesapeake & 0. R. R.
v. Martin (1931) 283 U. S. 209, 51 S. Ct. 453, 75 L. ed. 983.
32. Georgia F. & A. R. R. v. Blish M. Co. (1916) 241 U. S. 190, 36 S. Ct.
541, 60 L. ed. 948.
33. Chesapeake & 0. R. R. v. Martin (1931) 283 U. S. 209, 51 S. Ct.
453, 75 L. ed. 983.
34. Louisiana & W. R. R. v. Gardiner (1927) 273 U. S. 280, 47 S. Ct.
386, 71 L. ed. 644.
35. Leigh Ellis & Co. v. Davis (1923) 260 U. S. 682, 43 S. Ct. 423, 67
L. ed. 460.
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subject to a penalty of not less than $100 nor more than $5000
for each offense. An omission honestly and inadvertently made
from a report should not subject the carrier to the penalties.-
The Commission is authorized to require annual, periodical or
special reports from all motor carriers, common and contract.8 "
In conformity with this provision the Commission requires that
within ten days after the happening of an accident the carriers
file a report with the District Director of the district of the
domicil of the carrier and with the Commission, and that if a
death occur thereafter, occasioned by such accident, such death
be also reported.
Every motor carrier is required to file with the regulating
body of each state through which it operates, and also with the
Interstate Commerce Commission, the designation of a person
upon whom service of notices or orders may be made.
All orders of the Commission take effect within such reason-
able time as the Commission shall prescribe and remain in effect
for such length of time as ordered or until further order. Where
the Commission makes an order but subsequently dismisses the
proceeding, the dismissal operates as a rescission of the order.37
The Commission cannot make its orders retroactive, and where
no future date was prescribed the order is inoperative and in-
effective.38
All motor carriers are also required to file with the regulatory
body of each State through which it operates, a designation of
an agent upon whom process can be served issuing out of any
court having jurisdiction of the subject matter of any proceed-
ing at law or in equity brought against such carrier.39
XV. CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
Any person knowingly and willfully violating any provision of
the Act, or any rule, regulation, requirement or order issued
36. Oregon W. R. & N. Co. v. United States (C. C. A. 9, 1915) 222 Fed.
887, 889; Northern P. R. Co. v. United States (C. C. A. 8, 1919) 213 Fed.
162, 167; United States v. Northern P. R. R. (1916) 242 U. S. 190, 37
S. Ct. 22, 61 L. ed. 240; Elgin J. & E. R. R. v. United States (C. C. A. 7,
1915) 227 Fed. 411, 413.
36a. See. 220.
37. Minneapolis & St. L. R. R. v. Peoria & P. U. R. R. (1926) 270 U. S.
580, 46 S. Ct. 402, 70 L. ed. 743.
38. United States v. Baltimore & 0. R. R. (1931) 284 U. S. 195, 52 S. Ct.
109, 76 L. ed. 243.
39. Sec. 221(c).
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thereunder, or any term or condition of any certificate, permit
or license shall upon conviction be fined not more than $100 for
the first offense and not more than $500 for any subsequent of-
fense.3" Each day of such violation constitutes a separate of-
fense. Willfulness is an indispensable element.40 A corporation
is not chargeable with knowledge of facts which became known
to its agent, unless the agent in the line of his duty ought or
would reasonably be expected to communicate the knowledge to
his principal."
If any motor carrier operates in violation of the provisions of
the Act or any rule, regulation, requirement or order issued there-
under, or of any term or condition of its certificate or permit,
the Commission or its duly authorized agent may apply to the
United States District Court of any district through which such
carrier operates for the enforcement of the law, rule, regulation,
etc., and the court may enforce obedience by injunction or other
process, mandatory or otherwise, restraining further violation
and commanding obedience.42
Any carrier, shipper or consignee who shall knowingly offer,
grant or give, solicit, accept or receive any rebate, concession or
discrimination prohibited by the Act, or who by means of any
false statement or representation, or by the use of any false or
fictitious instrument or by any other means or advice, shall
knowingly and willfully assist, suffer or permit anyone to obtain
transportation for less than the applicable rate or seek to evade
or defeat any provision of the Act, is guilty of a misdemeanor
and subject to a fine of not more than $500 for the first offense
and not more than $2000 for any subsequent offense. 43 An offer
of a rebate, concession or discrimination is a violation of the
Act4 4 as well as the giving or receiving of such.45 It is unlawful
for a carrier to pay a shipper a commission as an inducement to
39a. Sec. 222(a).
40. Laser Grain Co. v. United States (C. C. A. 8, 1918) 250 Fed. 826,
830.
41. Elgin T. & E. R. R. v. United States (C. C. A. 7, 1918) 253 Fed. 907,
912.
42. Sec. 222(b).
43. Sec. 222(c).
44. United States v. Lehigh Valley Ry. Co. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1918)
254 Fed. 332, 334; United States v. Lehigh V. Ry. Co. (D. C. M. D. Pa.
1930) 43 F. (2d) 135, 140.
45. New York C. R. R. v. United States (1909) 212 U. S. 500, 505, 29
S. Ct. 309, 53 L. ed. 624.
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ship his freight over its route ;46 to knowingly declare an under-
valuation so as to get the benefit of a lower rate ;47 to lease to a
shipper at an inadequate rental to induce him to ship over the
carrier's route violates the statute ;48 to give one a greater length
of time than another for the payment of freight charges ;49 and to
disclose to any person other than the shipper or consignee of the
particular shipment, any information concerning the nature,
kind, quantity, destination, consignee, or routing of any ship-
ment, which information may be used to the detriment or preju-
dice of the shipper or consignee or which may improperly dis-
close his business transactions to a competitor. It is likewise
made unlawful for anyone to knowingly receive any such in-
formation °
No motor common carrier shall deliver freight at destination
until all charges have been paid, except under such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe50a The Commis-
sion has ordered that after assuring themselves that the charges
will be paid within the credit period, the carriers may extend
credit for seven days, excluding Sundays and legal holidays other
than Saturday half-holidays. 51 A carrier has the option to de-
mand its charges in advance or on delivery5 2 or within the ex-
tended period.
The Commission is also authorized to require the display, by
motor carriers, of suitable identification plate or plates on each
vehicle.52' The Commission has prescribed that an identification
plate, to be issued by it, shall be carried without obstruction on
the rear of each motor vehicle.
46. United States v. Milwaukee Ref. T. Co. (C. C. E. D. Wis. 1906) 145
Fed. 1007; United States v. Delaware L. & W. R. R. (C. C. S. D. N. Y.
1907) 152 Fed. 269; Lehigh V. R. R. v. United States (1917) 243 U. S. 444,
37 S. Ct. 434, 61 L. ed. 839.
47. Missouri K. & T. R. R. v. Harriman (1913) 227 U. S. 657, 671, 33
S. Ct. 397, 57 L. ed. 690.
48. Central of Ga. R. R. v. Blount (C. C. A. 5, 1917) 238 Fed. 292;
Cleveland C. C. & St. L. R. R. v. Hirsch (C. C. A. 6, 1913) 204 Fed. 849,
853.
49. Hocking V. R. R. v. United States (C. C. A. 6, 1914) 210 Fed. 735,
740.
50. Sec. 222(e).
50a. Sec. 223.
51. (1937) 2 M. C. C. 365.
52. Wadley S. R. R. v. Georgia (1915) 235 U. S. 651, 35 S. Ct. 214, 59
L. ed. 405; Louisville & N. R. R. v. Central I. & C. Co. (1924) 265 U. S.
59, 44 S. Ct. 441, 68 L. ed. 900.
52a. See. 224.
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The Commission is vested with the power to investigate and
report on the need of federal regulation of the sizes and weight
of motor vehicles. 52b The Act does not provide that the Commis-
sion shall determine what sizes and weights of motor vehicles
should be permitted to engage in interstate commerce 3 and
until the Commission reports to Congress and the latter enacts
legislation on the subject, the states may prescribe reasonable
regulations limiting the size and weight on their respective high-
ways.54
By Section 233 of the criminal code it is provided that the
Interstate Commerce Commission shall formulate regulations
for the safe interstate transportation of explosives and other
dangerous articles, including inflammable liquids, etc., and it is
made unlawful to carry any such except in accordance with the
regulations of the Commission. Motor common carriers are sub-
ject to these provisions. 5
52b. See. 225.
53. L. & L. Frt. Lines v. Railroad Comm. (D. C. S. D. Fla., 1936) 17
F. Supp. 13.
54. Barnwell v. South Carolina (D. C. E. D. S. C., 1937) 17 F. Supp.
803, 813.
55. Motor Bus & Truck Operation (1928) 140 I. C. C. 685.
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